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Abstract This paper discusses the judgment of the House of Lords in
Gillan [2006] UKHL 12, where the law lords examined the compatibility
of the power in ss. 44 and 45 of the Terrorism Act 2000 to stop and
search individuals with the Human Rights Act 1998. It is argued that the
decision of the House of Lords that ss. 44 and 45 are compatible with
Convention rights was wrong for a number of reasons. Not only did the
House of Lords fail to interpret and apply the applicable Convention
rights correctly, it also missed an important opportunity to develop the
principle of legality in the context of the Human Rights Act. Moreover,
the House failed to deal adequately with the troubling question of
whether the exercise and use of the stop and search power under the
Terrorism Act was racially discriminatory. These issues take on a par-
ticular importance not only because of the greater use of the power
since the so-called ‘7/7 attacks’, but also because of the disparate impact
that the use of the power has on racial minorities.
Keywords: human rights, stop and search, legality, discrimination,
terrorism, permissive powers
I. Introduction
On 9 September 2003 Kevin Gillan, a PhD student at the University of
Sheffield, was en route to a peaceful demonstration against the arms
trade when he was stopped and searched by two Metropolitan police
officers. Gillan was delayed for 20 minutes while the officers exercised
their powers under ss. 44 and 45 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA)1 to
search for ‘articles connected with terrorism’.2 The search yielded
nothing incriminating and no arrest was made. Gillan subsequently
brought an action by way of judicial review against the Metropolitan
* Department of Law, UWE Bristol. My thanks to Ed Cape, Howard Davis and the
anonymous referee for their very helpful comments on this paper. The usual
disclaimer applies.
1 Hereafter the Terrorism Act 2000 (c.11) is referred to as the ‘TA’ and ss. 44–45 of
the Terrorism Act as ‘ss. 44–45’.
2 44. (2) An authorization under this subsection authorizes any constable in
uniform to stop a pedestrian in an area or at a place specified in the
authorization and to search—
(a) the pedestrian;
(b) anything carried by him.
1Common Law World Review 37 (2008) 
DOI: 10.1350/clwr.2008.37.3.172
Police Service contending, amongst other things, that the stop and
search power contained in Part V of the TA was incompatible with his
Convention rights as scheduled to the Human Rights Act 1998
(HRA).3
II. An Exceptional Police Power:- the Background
Sections 44 and 45 were enacted in 2000 by Parliament as part of the
counterterrorist powers in Part V of the TA. The TA is primarily a
consolidating measure intended to provide the UK with a permanent
legal regime for dealing with terrorism. These permanent powers
combine many of the previous statutory provisions passed as tempor-
ary, emergency provisions. But once again powers that were once
viewed as exceptional and temporary have become permanent and
unexceptional.4 A legal regime designed to be a temporary derogation
(3) An authorization under subsection (1) or (2) may be given only if the
person giving it considers it expedient for the prevention of acts of
terrorism.
(5) If an authorization is given orally, the person giving it shall confirm it in
writing as soon as is reasonably practicable.
45. (1) The power conferred by an authorisation under section 44(1) or (2)—
(a) may be exercised only for the purpose of searching for articles of a
kind which could be used in connection with terrorism, and
(b) may be exercised whether or not the constable has grounds for
suspecting the presence of articles of that kind.
(2) A constable may seize and retain an article which he discovers in the
course of a search by virtue of section 44(1) or (2) and which he
reasonably suspects is intended to be used in connection with
terrorism.
(3) A constable exercising the power conferred by an authorization may
not require a person to remove any clothing in public except for
headgear, footwear, an outer coat, a jacket or gloves.
(4) Where a constable proposes to search a person or vehicle by virtue of
section 44(1) or (2) he may detain the person or vehicle for such time as
is reasonably required to permit the search to be carried out at or near
the place where the person or vehicle is stopped.
47. (1) A person commits an offence if he—
(a) fails to stop a vehicle when required to do so by a constable in the
exercise of the power conferred by an authorization under section
44(1);
(b) fails to stop when required to do so by a constable in the exercise of
the power conferred by an authorization under section 44(2);
(c) wilfully obstructs a constable in the exercise of the power conferred
by an authorization under section 44(1) or (2).
(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable on
summary conviction to—
(a) imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months,
(b) a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or
(c) both.
3 Human Rights Act 1998 (c.42), s. 1 and Sch 1. Hereinafter HRA.
4 Such emergency laws in the United Kingdom follow a familiar if somewhat
depressing path to permanence. To begin with statutory regimes such as the
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, c. 4 were viewed as
regrettable if necessary departures from the normal criminal justice process.
Exceptional violence requires an exceptional response. But with the passage of
time Parliament has in most cases come to the view that these once temporary
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and developed to deal with a specific threat has been replaced by a
permanent regime and intended to counter general threats. Indeed,
the radiating effect of emergency laws has in modern times contamin-
ated other parts of the criminal justice process.
The powers contained in Part V of the TA have their origins in the
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA). Before the pas-
sage of the 1994 Act the police would have to rely on s. 1 of the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) to stop and search indi-
viduals suspected of being involved in terrorist activities. From the
police perspective s. 1 of PACE suffered from the handicap of requir-
ing a reasonable suspicion.5 The CJPOA changed this situation by
amending the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act
(PTA) 1989 to include a standardless power to stop both vehicles and
people. In other words the power is not constrained by any conditions
precedent that need to be satisfied before it can be lawfully exercised.6
By way of contrast, an ordinary stop and search under PACE requires
that a police constable has ‘reasonable grounds for suspecting that he
will find stolen or prohibited articles’.7 Under the PTA a police officer
can stop an individual and search him for ‘articles of a kind which
could be used for a purpose connected with the commission, prepara-
tion or instigation of acts of terrorism’8 although not the actual per-
son. The power was qualified through the requirements that it must
have been both authorized by an appropriate officer and its exercise
must be connected with terrorism relating to either Northern Ireland
or the affairs of the UK. Unless renewed the power lapsed after 28
days. These powers were judged to be necessary by the then Home
Secretary in order to deal with an anticipated upsurge in Irish Nation-
alist violence aimed at targets in London, which subsequently failed to
materialize.
In 1996 Parliament extended the power to include the search of
persons.9 The authorization process differed in two respects from the
previous regime. First, the authorization could be given orally by the
appropriate officer, although it would need to be confirmed later in
measures are essential bulwarks in the ‘war against drugs/crime/terror’. The
exception has once more become the norm. A good example of this tendency in
action is of course the changes to the right to silence enacted first in the context
of Northern Ireland, and subsequently in the rest of the UK.
5 In the alternative an officer might have decided to make an arrest under s. 14 of
the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Additional Powers) Act 1996, c. 7.
6 The CJPOA itself contained a similar new power in s. 60 where an appropriate
office can authorize standardless searches and seizures if he reasonably believes
that incidents involving serious violence may take place in any locality in his area.
7 PACE, s. 1(3).
8 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 (c. 4), s. 13A, inserted by
CJPOA, s. 81.
9 Prevention of Terrorism (Additional Powers) Act 1996 (c. 7), s. 5 inserting s.13B
into the PTA 1989. Although a person could now be searched as opposed to
anything they were carrying, s. 13B limited that power: ‘Nothing in this section
authorizes a constable to require a person to remove any of his clothing in public
other than any headgear, footwear, outer coat, jacket or gloves’ (s. 13B(4)).
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writing. And second, the Home Secretary was granted the power to
superintend the authorizations.10As with much emergency legislation
before,11 and since,12 the 1996 amendments and additions were
rushed through Parliament with little effective debate, in this case in
just one day.13 The new provisions were justified on the grounds that
the government feared a terrorist attack during the 80th anniversary
of the Dublin Rising. Of particular concern was the possibility of
attacks by nationalists armed with pocket incendiary devices. It subse-
quently became apparent that the need for such provisions had been
considered some time before.14
It was these temporary provisions that were re-enacted in the per-
manent TA, albeit with some amendments.15 As it now stands s. 44
empowers a senior police officer to authorize searches under s. 45
where he ‘considers it expedient for the prevention of acts of terror-
ism’.16 An authorization may be made orally although it must be con-
firmed as soon as is reasonably practicable in writing.17 Moreover,
every authorization made under s. 44 must be confirmed by the Home
Secretary within 48 hours, or it will lapse. In any case, an authoriza-
tion lapses after 28 days unless renewed.18 While authorized, a police
officer may search vehicles and people for ‘articles of a kind which
could be used in connection with terrorism . . . whether or not the
constable has grounds for suspecting the presence of articles of that
kind’.19 The power is thus derived from the authorization. And be-
cause it represents a departure from the normal standard applicable
to police searches the power has, albeit it to a limited extent, been
surrounded by safeguards.20 First, the power needs to be authorized
by the appropriate officer with knowledge of the area where it will be
applied. That activation is subject to confirmation by the Home Sec-
retary. And second, given the extraordinary nature of the power,
the authorizations should last for a limited time. However, so that the
police can rapidly respond to a threat should it suddenly arise, the rel-
evant officer has the power to authorize searches orally. Indeed, it
10 See K. Reid ‘Prevention of Terrorism (Additional Powers) Act 1996’ [1996] 4 Web
JCLI; see http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1996/issue4/reid4.html.
11 Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 passed in the wake of the Birmingham pub
bombings. At the time the threat to the UK from Irish Republican violence was
described as the greatest threat since the end of the Second World War. See e.g.
Hansard HC Deb, vol 882, col 743 (28th November 1974).
12 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (c. 24).
13 O. Gross, ‘Chaos Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be
Constitutional?’ (2003) 112 Yale LJ 1011, 1033.
14 See above n. 10.
15 R(Gillan) v Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police [2006] UKHL 12 at para. 9, per
Lord Bingham.
16 TA, ss. 44 and 45(3). The officer must be of ACPO rank: ss. 44 and 45(4).
17 Ibid., ss. 44 and 45(5).
18 Ibid., s. 46.
19 Ibid., ss. 44 and 45(1).
20 Whether or not they are effective will be considered below. For example, see the
discussion in Part VI on legality and discrimination.
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might be argued the scheme in Part V seeks to balance the need for a
special power against the broader interests of a free society by limit-
ing the departure from the legal norm to situations where it is neces-
sary. However, whatever the theory, since the Terrorism Act came
into force there has been a substantial period where a series of ‘rolling
authorizations’ has been in force in the Metropolitan and City of
London police areas. Moreover, not only were these authorizations
not a response to specific threats, but stops and searches under the
authority of ss. 44 and 45 were authorized even before 9/11. In prac-
tice an exceptional power intended to be employed on a limited basis
has, through administrative action, become quasi-permanent. By con-
trast, the powers under the old PTA had been used more sparingly.21
III. Judgments
In the High Court Mr Gillan challenged the exercise of the powers on
three grounds.22 First, it was contended that Parliament clearly in-
tended that the authorization of the power in s. 44 was to be limited to
circumstances where there was judged to be an imminent threat to a
specific location and where ordinary police powers were likely to be
insufficient. Brooke LJ, who gave the judgment of the court, dis-
agreed. Parliament had clearly intended that an authorization could
cover an entire police area and not simply a location as s. 60 of the
CJPOA did.23 Parliament intended to grant a broad discretion to
the appropriate officer because ‘a need might crop up at any time
for the targeted anti-terrorism patrols, the mobile road checks or the
other elements of the anti-terrorism strategy, and it is understandable
why, if there is a long-standing general threat, the police wished to be
able to exercise these powers anywhere in the police district’.24 In
deciding to issue an authorization, matters of public safety and na-
tional security would need to be considered, and these were matters
requiring expertise possessed by the police and Home Secretary.
Some degree of deference was therefore required.25 The second
strand to the application was the contention that the police had acted
unlawfully when exercising their ss. 44 and 45 power because in part
21 Home Office, Review of the Operation of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act 1989 (1999) ch. 10 passim. In 1999 s. 13A was used; s. 13B was not.
22 R(Gillan) v Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police [2003] EWHC 2545 (Admin).
23 Section 60(1) provides:
Where a police officer of or above the rank of superintendent reasonably
believes that—
(a) incidents involving serious violence may take place in any locality in his
area, and
(b) it is expedient to do so to prevent their occurrence, he may give an
authorization that the powers to stop and search persons and vehicles
conferred by this section shall be exercisable at any place within that locality
for a period not exceeding twenty four hours.
24 Above n. 22 at para. 33.
25 Ibid. at para. 35.
5
STOP AND SEARCH, TERRORISM AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS DEFICIT
they had insufficient guidance on how to exercise that power. This
was an issue which required anxious scrutiny: ‘The wider the power,
and the more it impinges on personal liberty, the more anxious the
court will be to ensure that it is used to achieve the purpose for which
it was granted and not for any ulterior or extraneous purpose’.26
However, in the current case there was just enough evidence to show
that the powers had not been misused.27 Nevertheless, the police
needed to review their training and procedures in this area to ensure
that the powers were not misused.28 The third head of challenge re-
lated to the HRA. Notwithstanding the important human rights im-
plications bound up in this case, the High Court summarily dismissed
this argument. In Brooke LJ’s opinion if any Convention rights were
infringed there was adequate textual justification in the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to uphold their compatibility.29
Only if the police were using these powers as part of day-to-day
policing on the streets of London would there be force in this submis-
sion.30 Gillan appealed.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In essence the Court of
Appeal agreed with the High Court but it differed from the decision in
the court below in two important aspects. First, the Convention rights
points were more fully argued and considered by the Court of Appeal.
These were ultimately unsuccessful. However, Lord Woolf CJ made a
number of important points in relation to the application of Conven-
tion rights. With respect to the applicability of Article 5, the coercive
detention on the street for the purposes of a search fell into a grey
area under Article 5.31 His lordship concluded that in the final analysis
‘a short detainment pursuant to a stop and search will normally fall
outside Article 5’.32 Moreover, the scheme contained in the TA could
not be said to be arbitrary.33 The second point of difference with the
High Court was the Court of Appeal’s evident unhappiness with
the absence of evidence submitted by the respondents by way of
justification.34 Lord Woolf CJ was rightly concerned with the paucity
of evidence. Similarly, Lord Woolf CJ also expressed his concern at
the absence of clear directions being given to officers as to how to
employ their special powers. The instruction offered was quite simply
‘lamentable’.35 Mr Gillan appealed once more.
26 Ibid. at para. 53.
27 Ibid. at para. 58.
28 Ibid. at para. 58.
29 Ibid. at para. 64.
30 Ibid. at para. 63.
31 R(Gillan) v Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police [2005] QB 388 at para. 37.
32 Ibid. at para. 46. His lordship gave no indication of what constitutes an abnormal
searchwhich would thus bring Art. 5 into play.
33 Ibid. at para. 49.
34 Ibid. at paras. 51, 54, 55 and 56.
35 Ibid. at para. 53. The instruction consisted of a single PowerPoint slide shown
during the officers’ daily briefing.
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In his unsuccessful appeal to the House of Lords Gillan raised es-
sentially the same points. In dismissing the appeal the House of Lords
handed down a judgment which has important implications for Con-
vention rights and the rule of law. In common with the judgments
below, a unanimous House of Lords agreed that the powers in ques-
tion were indeed sweeping but nevertheless justified given the terror-
ist threat, which they argued, the United Kingdom currently faces.36
There were no grounds for concluding that Parliament intended the
powers to be used only where necessary, given the express condition
that their use be ‘expedient’. The scheme was intended to give the
police some degree of flexibility, especially in the post-9/11 environ-
ment. The powers were however subject to a ‘wide variety of restric-
tions and safeguards’37 and the possibility of civil action in the case of
any alleged misuse. Similarly, the rolling authorizations could not be
faulted, complying as they did with the letter of the law.38
The applicant’s arguments with respect to Convention rights were
no more successful. The House of Lords unanimously decided that
Article 5 had not been infringed. Lord Bingham concluded that as
the procedure was so brief there no deprivation of liberty within the
terms of Article 5(1).39 But even assuming that there was an inter-
ference with the right to liberty then in his lordship’s opinion it would
be justified within the terms of Article 5(1)(b).40 The arguments with
respect to Article 8 were similarly rejected. The search did not fall
within the terms of Article 8 according to a majority.41 Nevertheless,
Lord Brown did conclude that privacy rights could be infringed al-
though any interference was justified.42 No issue arose under either
Article 10 or Article 11.
Before the House two further points were pressed, neither with any
success. Firstly, the applicants contended that the regime in ss. 44 and
45 of the TA was inconsistent with the principle of legality contained
in the ECHR.43 The authorizations were inaccessible not having been
published, and the power to stop and search was unfettered, broad
36 Gillan [2006] UKHL 12 at para. 13.
37 Ibid. at para. 74, per Lord Brown.
38 Ibid. at para. 18.
39 Ibid. at para. 25. See also para. 63.
40 Article 5(1)(b) provides:
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a
procedure prescribed by law:
. . .
the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful
order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation
prescribed by law;
41 Above n. 36 at para. 28, per Lord Scott who concluded that an infringement
would be ‘theoretical’.
42 Ibid. at para.75.
43 Ibid. at para. 32.
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and ill-defined.44 Thus the power could be exercised arbitrarily,
thereby negating the principle of legality. Lord Bingham was far from
persuaded: ‘The principle of legality has no application in this con-
text’.45 The legislation was detailed, specific and unambiguous. The
powers in ss. 44 and 45 were defined with considerable precision.
The authorization to bring the power into effect was not law and did
not need to be publicized. Indeed, the effectiveness of the provisions
may be undermined if there was a requirement to publish. The regime
contained sufficient safeguards.46 Moreover, in Lord Bingham’s opin-
ion, a police officer is not free to act arbitrarily and would be open to
civil suit if he did.47 In the ‘real world a police officer will always have
some reason for selecting a particular individual as a person to be
stopped and searched’.48 The best safeguard according to Lord Hope
was to ensure that the powers were properly exercised through guid-
ance and training.49
The second additional point on appeal concerned the potentially
discriminatory use of the powers. Although ultimately the law lords
agreed that no racial discrimination had in fact occurred, they arrived
at that conclusion by different reasons. For instance, Lord Scott con-
cluded that the use of the powers disclosed no discrimination on
racial grounds and even if it had existed any such use could never-
theless be upheld as lawful within the terms of the Race Relations
Act.50 However, Lords Hope and Brown were more exercised by this
point. As Lord Hope put it, ‘the risk that it will be employed in a
discriminatory fashion cannot be discounted entirely’.51 The decision
in the Roma Rights case52 stood as a reminder that discrimination on
the basis of racial origin was always suspect. Thus a person cannot be
selected for a stop and search simply on the grounds of their racial
origins even if the search is necessary to prevent terrorism.53 The fact
that a person is Asian is not a legitimate reason for the exercise of the
powers, although ethnicity could be relied upon in drawing up a
profile of possible terrorist suspects.54 Provided that the powers are
exercised in accordance with PACE Code A the power should not be
44 Ibid. at para. 32.
45 Ibid. at para. 15. His lordship considered what his colleagues called legality under
the heading of lawfulness.
46 Ibid. at paras. 55–6.
47 Ibid. at para. 35. See also paras. 55 and 57, per Lord Hope.
48 Ibid. at para. 67.
49 Ibid. at para. 57.
50 Ibid. at para. 68; see ss. 41 and 42 of the TA.
51 Ibid. at para. 47.
52 R (European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Office at Prague Airport [2004]
UKHL 55.
53 Gillan [2006] UKHL 12 at para. 44.
54 Ibid. at para. 91, per Lord Brown.
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discriminatory.55 Indeed, while al-Qaeda remained one of the prin-
cipal terrorist threats to the UK it was inevitable that a dispropor-
tionate number of Asian people would be stopped and search under
the powers.56
While Kevin Gillan was ultimately unsuccessful in his challenge to
ss. 44 and 45 of the TA, his case is nevertheless an important one for a
number of reasons. First, Gillan’s case throws into relief the inevitable
tension between the liberty of the individual on the one hand and the
counterterrorist requirements of the state on the other. The power in
ss. 44 and 45 of the TA places ‘the liberty of every man in the hands of
every petty officer’57 through the adoption of, in effect, a standardless
discretion that arguably facilitates arbitrary action.58 In such a context
it is especially important that the judiciary develops an effective no-
tion of the principle of legality to constrain the scope and exercise of
what are, by any measure, exceptional powers. The principle of legal-
ity is an integral part of the Convention forming the keystone in the
arch supporting the guaranteed rights and freedoms. Without a ro-
bust notion of the rule of law underpinning Convention rights and
freedoms, the guarantee of rights and freedoms would be essentially
theoretical. It is a significant weakness of the decisions that the issue
of legality was inadequately dealt with.
IV. The Interpretation of Convention Rights
In Gillan’s case the courts, particularly the House of Lords, interpreted
Convention rights in a conservative manner that was overly deferen-
tial to the executive. This approach to judicial interpretation is nothing
new under the HRA. But Gillan provides yet another clear example of
the poverty of thought and simple lack of imagination of the senior
British judiciary when deciding difficult cases under the HRA. For
example, in reaching its decision the House of Lords was not assisted
by Strasbourg authority. The European Court of Human Rights has
yet to consider the interaction between Convention rights and police
powers to stop and search individuals randomly. Thus their lordships
were unable, as they have been in other HRA cases such as Bellinger,59
to apply European jurisprudence.60 Such circumstances create diffi-
culties for the courts. On the one hand is the admonition for a court
under the authority of s. 2 of the HRA ‘not to cast around in the
55 Ibid. at para. 81, per Lord Brown.
56 Ibid. at para. 80, per Lord Brown.
57 The words are those of James Otis on the Writs of Assistance. Quoted in A.
Amterdam, ‘Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment’ (1973–1974) 58 Minn LR 349
at 411.
58 Code A of PACE could possibly have provided some regulation of the exercise of
the power, as indeed could the statutory injunction that the power be used only in
connection with terrorist crime.
59 Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21.
60 Goodwin v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 88.
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European Human Rights Reports like blackletter lawyers seeking
clues . . . [but in light of s. 2(1) of the HRA to] . . . draw out the broad
principles which animate the Convention’.61 And on the other hand is
the view exposed by Lord Bingham in Ullah where his lordship con-
cluded that a court should not ‘without strong reason dilute or
weaken the effect of the Strasbourg case law . . . it is of course open to
member states to provide for rights more generous than those guar-
anteed by the Convention, but such provision should not be the prod-
uct of interpretation of the Convention by national courts, since the
meaning of the Convention should be uniform throughout the states
party to i. . . The duty of national courts is to keep pace with the
Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time: no more, but cer-
tainly no less.’62 The problem with such a doctrine is that there is a
temptation to treat the case law of Strasbourg as offering ‘off the peg’
solutions to cases. Where there is case law in point this, it might be
argued, is not overly problematic. However, reliance on Strasbourg
case law brings with it an inherent difficulty. The jurisprudential tech-
nique of the European Court of Human Rights has never been to
identify explicitly the principles and purposes of the rights and free-
doms in the Convention.63 The European Court of Human Rights
focuses heavily on the facts of the individual applications rather than
engaging with the conceptual and philosophical issues underlying
them. Consequently the Court has tended not to expound and elab-
orate its decisions into a coherent body of jurisprudence and as a
consequence its case law is rather formulaic. For example, the pro-
portionality test is often applied without a weighing of the limbs of the
proportionality test.64 The doctrine in Ullah has simply translated
these flaws into British human rights jurisprudence, and has been
responsible for the impoverished state of domestic human rights
jurisprudence of which Gillan is an example.65 This approach is expli-
citly predicated on the justification that the HRA was intended by
Parliament to provide a domestic forum for the redress of Convention
related claims without the need for an application to Strasbourg.66
However, while this is true, for some reason the other intention of the
HRA has been ignored. ‘Enabling courts in the United Kingdom to
rule on the application of the Convention’, the White Paper, Rights
61 Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank
(2001) Ch 51 at para. 44, per Morritt V-C.
62 R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26, [2004], 2 AC 323, at para. 20 per
Lord Bingham.
63 A. McHarg, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual
Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights’ (1999) 62 MLR 671 at 673.
64 Ibid. at 687.
65 There are other cases where this tendency is in evidence: Secretary of State for
Work and Pensions v M [2006] UKHL 11; Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 2) of
2002 [2004] UKHL 43; Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 1) of 2001 [2003] UKHL
68; and R (S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 39.
66 See for example R (S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 39.
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Brought Home argued, ‘will also help to influence the development of
case law on the Convention by the European Court of Human Rights
on the basis of familiarity with our laws and customs and of sensitivity
to practices and procedures in the United Kingdom . . . Our courts’
decisions will provide the European Court with a useful source of
information and reasoning for its own decisions’.67 In practice the
doctrine in Ullah not only frustrates that intention, it has the left
the courts without the intellectual tools to reason adequately in human
rights cases.68
i. The Right to Liberty and Freedom of Movement
Mr Justice Holmes once remarked that ‘it is one of the misfortunes of
the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a
long time cease to provoke further analysis’.69 The jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights with respect to Article 5 is a
good example of such a phenomenon. The leading case, Guzzardi v
Italy,70 is frequently applied in an almost mechanical fashion. And this
is problematic since the test that the European Court of Human Rights
enunciated under Article 5 for determining whether or not there has
been a deprivation of liberty provides ‘neither bright-line rule nor
anything that begins to approximate to a clear definition’.71 The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights simply unhelpfully asserted, and has
continued to do so ever since, that ‘the difference between depriva-
tion of and restriction upon liberty is nonetheless merely one of de-
gree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance’.72 Such an
elastic definition provides little concrete guidance as to how it might
apply in different contexts. In practice the Guzzardi test provides an
almost open-ended judicial discretion for the application of Article 5.
This characteristic of the jurisprudence is, no doubt, what exercised
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice to dissent in Guzzardi. Applying this nebulous
test in Guzzardi the European Court of Human Rights extended
Article 5 to cover a situation that was more properly dealt with by
Article 2 of Protocol 4.
With such limited guidance it is perhaps not surprising that British
courts have struggled when applying Article 5. Indeed, given the
flaws of European case law in this context it is arguable that British
courts could make a useful contribution to the development of Con-
vention jurisprudence by injecting some analytical rigour. However,
in Gillan instead of approaching the interpretation of Article 5 afresh
and reasoning from principle, the House of Lords simply applied by
67 Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, Cm 3782 (1997) para. 1.18.
68 See above n. 64.
69 Hyde v US 225 US 347 at 391 (1912).
70 [1980] ECHR 7367/76.
71 Chaskalson et al., Constitutional Law of South Africa (Juta: Cape Town, 2006) para.
40–33.
72 [1980] ECHR 7367/76 at para. 88.
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analogy the ‘encysted phrases’ of Guzzardi v Italy.73 No doubt because
our courts believe they are duty bound to follow the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights, no attempt was made to look
for the underlying purpose of Article 5 or indeed to consider whether
the security interests of the individuals had been adversely affected.
Although we are told that the HRA is a constitutional instrument,
being in effect a British bill of rights,74 little attempt has been made to
interpret it as such by the higher judiciary. In almost every compar-
able jurisdiction courts, when faced with such issues, begin with a
purposive interpretation of the extent to which any constitutional
guarantee applies. The purpose of a constitutional guarantee is to be
understood in light of the interests that it is designed to protect. And
this analysis ‘is to be undertaken, and the purpose of the right or
freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the character and
larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to articu-
late the specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the con-
cept enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of
the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated
within the text of the charter’.75 Moreover, it is axiomatic that as it is a
constitution that is being interpreted, the guarantees must be read
and interpreted in a generous manner.76 However, British courts have
treated these principles as mere shibboleths that can be occasionally
recited, and then safely ignored. In Gillan there was no attempt to
interpret Article 5, or indeed the other applicable Convention rights,
purposively. Indeed it is hard to say that any of the applicable Conven-
tion rights were by any standard interpreted generously. There is a
clear danger here that unless the HRA is interpreted as a constitu-
tional instrument it will in time represent not a ‘living tree’77 rather a
judicial bonsai.
The adherence to the rule in Ullah’s case meant that a wealth of
useful authority was overlooked. Although the European Court of
Human Rights has not considered the issue of whether a police stop
and search interferes with Convention rights, the issue has been
73 Subsequently, the absence of full and proper analysis in Guzzardi has generated
more forceful criticism from members of the House who did not sit in Gillan. See
for example the Home Secretary v JJ [2007] UKHL 45 at para. 30; per Lord
Hoffmann (dissenting) and para. 80, per Lord Carswell (dissenting). In the end,
notwithstanding the criticisms Guzzardi was followed and applied. This led to the
bizarre situation where being subject to a control order under the Prevention of
Terrorism Act 2005 (c.2) for more than 16 hours per day was incompatible with
Art. 5 (para. 108, per Lord Brown). It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the
figure of 16 hours was arrived at on anything other than a largely subjective
basis.
74 McCartan Turkington Breen v Times Newspapers [2000] 3 WLR 1670 at 1686, per
Lord Steyn.
75 R v Big M Drug Mart [1985] 1 SCR 295 at para. 117, per Dickson J.
76 Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1979] 3 All ER 21 at 25, per Lord Wilberforce.
77 Edwards v Attorney-General of Canada [1930] AC 134 at 136, per Lord Sankey LC.
Tryer v UK [1978] ECHR 5856/72 at para. 31.
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considered in other jurisdictions.78 In Gillan the House of Lords con-
cluded that the powers in the TA were more an interference with
freedom of movement than the right to liberty. The interference
with the right to freedom of movement by random stops was con-
sidered by the Zimbabwean Supreme Court in Elliot v Commissioner
of Police.79 In Elliot the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether
the absolute and uncontrolled discretion to stop members of the pub-
lic randomly and demand the production of their identity cards was
consistent with the Constitution. Under s. 10 of the Zimbabwean
National Registration Act any person who failed to produce their
identity card was guilty of an offence.80 Gubbay CJ held that the
impunged provisions infringed the constitutional guarantee to free-
dom of movement. The power in s. 10 permitted a random stop. The
section did not specify any grounds or cause for stopping the person.
Consequently it could be employed in an entirely arbitrary manner.
An officer could act on his own whim and out of malice or spite. As
Gubbay CJ observed:
individual police officers will have different reasons. Some may tend to
stop the young, others the elderly; some only men, others women; some
the poorly attired, others those with the outward appearance of afflu-
ence; some those who are jacketless, others those without handbags;
and so on. Racial considerations may even be a factor. If it is unneces-
sary that the stoppage be based upon reasonable suspicion that the
person is not carrying an identity document and that all the police
officer need say is ‘I stopped him because I was seeking persons without
identity documents’, how many innocent persons will be so accosted to
apprehend one without an identity document?81
His lordship went on to conclude that simply because an officer was
acting within the law did not mean he is not doing so arbitrarily.
There was ‘no essential link between the two concepts’.82 A random
stop under the power no matter how brief and for whatever purpose
was a detention, and thus an infringement of the right of freedom of
movement.83 And as this infringement could not be justified on the
grounds of public order the section was unconstitutional. However,
78 The European Commission of Human Rights (hereafter the Commission) in B v
France 10179/82 13/05/87 DR 52 at 120 did consider the compatibility of the
French law that required a person to produce proof of identity in limited
circumstances and thereafter to detain a person at a police station for up to six
hours while their identity was confirmed. The Commission held (at 126) that this
was compatible with Art. 5(1)(b) representing a ‘fair balance’ between the right to
liberty and an obligation prescribed by law. The Commission declined to decide
whether there had been a deprivation of liberty within the terms of Article 5 on
the basis that the law covered the situation that the applicant complained of. See
further at 125–6.
79 [1997] 3 LRC 15.
80 National Registration Act (Statutes of Zimbabwe: Ch. 10:17, s. 10(1)(c).
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while freedom of movement is not a Convention right, it is nonethe-
less a right at common law.84 Yet there was no consideration of this by
their lordships.
Be that as it may, the difference between liberty and freedom of
movement is one of degree. It is arguable that the House of Lords was
wrong to conclude that the power in ss. 44 and 45 does not affect the
right to liberty.85 For instance, Lord Bingham concluded that an indi-
vidual subject to the powers in ss. 44 and 45 would be ‘detained in the
sense of kept from proceeding or kept waiting . . . [but] there [would
be] no deprivation of liberty’.86 This is quite simply wrong. Article 5 is
a right with a considerable pedigree. The possibility of arbitrary inter-
ference with the liberty of the subject has long been a central concern
of English common law. Blackstone, for instance, observed that:
the law of England regards, asserts, and preserves the personal liberty
of individuals. This personal liberty consists in the power of loco-
motion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person to whatsoever
place one’s own inclination may direct; without imprisonment or re-
straint, unless by due course of law . . . [The] confinement of the person,
by secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his sufferings are unknown or
forgotten is a dangerous engine of arbitrary government . . . [Moreover]
the confinement of the person, in any way, is an imprisonment. So that
the keeping a man against his will in a private house, putting him in
the stocks, arresting or forcibly detaining him in the street, is an
imprisonment.87
For Blackstone the right to liberty and the right to personal security
were absolute or primary rights necessary for freedom.88 Similarly
Dicey concluded that ‘the right to personal liberty as understood in
England means in substance a person’s right not to be subjected to
imprisonment, arrest, or other physical coercion in any manner that
does not admit of legal justification’.89 This English heritage has
clearly been transposed into Article 5 for, as the European Court of
84 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. MacQuillan [1995] 4 All ER
400 at 421, per Sedley LJ. R (Craven) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2001] All ER (D) 74 at para. 35: ‘Freedom of movement is a fundamental value of
the common law and I would add of the Convention’, per Buxton LJ. Of course as
a common law right, freedom of movement can be limited by statute. However,
such rights can only be limited by express wording or necessary implication. R v
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 at 131,
per Lord Hoffmann. This is a feature of the ‘intermediate constitution’. See Laws
LJ in International Transport Roth Gmb v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2002] EWCA Civ 158 at para. 71.
85 Gillan [2006] UKHL 12 at para. 25, per Lord Bingham.
86 Ibid.
87 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon,
Oxford: 1765–1769) Book 1, ch. 1, 131–2. Emphasis added.
88 A. W. B. Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire (OUP: Oxford, 2001)
29–30.
89 A. V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Law of the Constitution (OUP: Oxford, 1886)
207–8. The TA, of course, provides legal justification in a narrow sense. However,
because ss. 44 and 45 create a standardless discretion, in effect no justification is
required.
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Human Rights has made consistently clear, that Article is intended to
protect individuals from arbitrary deprivations of their physical lib-
erty.90 Article 5 of the ECHR is a guarantee of ‘individual liberty in its
classic sense, that is to say the physical liberty of the person . . . its aim
is to ensure that no one should be dispossessed of this liberty in an
arbitrary fashion’.91 The ‘protection against arbitrary arrest and de-
tention’, contained in Article 5, concluded the European Commission
of Human Rights, ‘was one of the principal considerations of the
drafters of this treaty’.92 That concern created a strong right that is
one of the ‘first rank’ rights that protect the individual in a democratic
society.93 Consequently, Article 5 is subject only to a set of very nar-
row and specific limits. In essence Article 5 is the classic articulation
of the protection of physical liberty through a bodyguard of legality.
Furthermore, as the text makes clear, Article 5 extends to the protec-
tion of both the liberty and security of the individual. While the secur-
ity interests of the individual have received little attention from the
European Court of Human Rights over the years, nevertheless what
case law exists does allow two important conclusions to be drawn.94
First, the type of ‘security’ interests contemplated by Article 5(1) are
those which are related to the physical liberty interests of the indi-
vidual. Second, the guarantee of ‘security’ is in essence a protection
against the arbitrary interference with the physical liberty guaranteed
by Article 5.95 Moreover, as the text makes clear, the framers of the
ECHR clearly intended that Article 5 apply to situations that were not
arrests because, although an arrest includes detention, detention does
not necessarily include arrest.96 There are a range of situations where
agents of the state conduct coercive procedures, which are not arrest,
but which involve the restraint or control of an individual,97 prevent-
ing people going where they please. Thus not every deprivation of
liberty is an arrest.98 Detention includes an element of state compul-
sion, which might include but is not limited to arrest, but which never-
theless interferes with the physical liberty and security of the
individual. At one end of the spectrum detention might include for-
cible admission to a hospital under the Mental Health Act, whereas at
90 Luckanov v Bulgaria [1997] ECHR 21915/93 at para. 41. Assanidze v Georgia [2004]
ECHR 71503/01 at para. 171.
91 Engel v Netherlands [1981] ECHR 5100/76 at para. 58.
92 East African Asians v United Kingdom (1973) DR 78 at para. 222.
93 Along with with Arts. 2, 3 and 4. See McKay v United Kingdom [2006] ECHR
543/03 at para. 30.
94 Khudoyorov v Russia [2005] ECHR 6847/02 at para. 142.
95 See A and others v FRG 5673/72, 5670/72 and 7729/76 at para. 28. X v FRG
8334/78 (1981) 24 DR 103 at 107 para. 3.
96 For a similar reading of s. 2(c) of the Canadian Bill of Rights see Chromiak v The
Queen [1980] 1 SCR 471, at para. 13, per Ritchie J. See also R v Goodwin (1993) 2
NZLR 153 at 200, per Hardie Boys J.
97 Or the reasonable apprehension that such restraint or control will be applied.
98 R v Goodwin (1993) 2 NZLR 153 at 173, per Cooke P, at 188, per Richardson J, at
200, per Hardie Boys J.
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the other end it could include short-lived interferences such as com-
pulsory blood tests99 or stops and searches. However, on the basis of
the decision in Gillan, one might conclude that Article 5 applied only
to arrests and not simply detentions in the context of criminal jus-
tice.100 Yet in the context of a stop under the TA a refusal to submit to a
police officer’s order to submit to a search constitutes a criminal of-
fence, as does wilfully obstructing such a search.101 Both are punish-
able by imprisonment.102 As Lord Bingham observed in Gillan, a
member of the public is under a duty not to obstruct a police officer
who is conducting a search within the terms of the Act.103 There can
be little doubt that the right to liberty ‘is implicated by laws which
impose imprisonment as a penalty for their non-observance’.104 For
example, in The Queen v Therens the Supreme Court of Canada had to
determine whether there had been a deprivation of liberty for the
purposes of the Canadian Charter when a car driver was requested to
undertake a breathalyser test by a police officer under the provisions
of the Criminal Code. If there had been a deprivation of liberty then
the defendant would be entitled, it was argued, to the assistance of
counsel as required by s. 10 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.105
In deciding that there had been a deprivation of liberty Le Dain J held
that a detention for the purposes of the Charter occurred in three
situations. First, when there is a deprivation of physical liberty
through the application of physical constraint. Second, ‘when a police
officer or other agent of the state assumes control over the movement
of a person by a demand or direction which may have significant legal
consequences’.106 And thirdly, where the individual is subject to ‘psy-
chological compulsion in that the individual acquiesces because he
reasonably believes that he has no choice but to submit’.107 The com-
mon theme running throughout all these situations is that ‘there must
be some form of compulsion or coercion to constitute an interference
99 X v Austria (1979) DR & R 154 at 156. App No. 8278/78. ‘The Commission is of the
opinion that enforcing a blood test on a person is a deprivation of liberty even if
this deprivation is of very short length’. The requirement to provide a blood
sample was compulsory in paternity cases.
100 See also Austin v Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police [2007] EWCA Civ 989,
CA where the Court of Appeal held that where an individual was detained in
Oxford Street, London by the police for a period of seven and a half hours Article
5 was not infringed.
101 At common law the individual is under no compulsion to comply with a request to
stop and answer questions. Indeed, in the absence of any positive legal authority
any detention would be an unlawful imprisonment. R v Goodwin (1993) 2 NZLR
153 at 163, per Cooke P.
102 TA, s. 47.
103 Gillan [2006] UKHL 12 at para. 26.
104 Ferreira v Levin NO [1996] 3 LRC 527 at para. 179, per Chalksason P.
105 Section 10 provides a number of rights, such as the right to counsel, to be
granted to individuals arrested or detained.
106 The Queen v Therens [1985] 1 SCR 613 at para. 53. Dissenting, but not on this
point.
107 R v Lewis (2007) 250 NSR (2d) 283 at para. 21, per Fichaud J.
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with liberty’.108 Thus when faced with a request, a demand or direc-
tion from an agent of the state, does a person reasonably regard
himself as free to refuse?109 Criminal liability for refusing to comply is
in effect compulsion and thus engages the right to liberty:110 ‘any
criminal liability for failure to comply with a demand or direction of a
police office must be sufficient to make compliance involuntary’.111 As
was noted above, Lord Bingham concluded that a person stopped
under the authority of ss. 44 and 45 was not detained but merely kept
waiting. On reflection this view cannot stand. To begin with, the fact
that the stop was likely to be short-lived is a separate issue from
whether or not the detention is arbitrary. Whether or not the stop was
arbitrary should have warranted separate consideration under Article
5. Furthermore, a person who is required to stop his car by a red
traffic light is kept waiting. After a short delay he is allowed on his
way. No doubt some might argue that this too is an interference with
the right to liberty. After all, an individual who ignores a red light and
drives through risks not only an accident but also a conviction under
the road traffic laws. However, such regulation differs in two im-
portant aspects from the power in the TA. First, under the TA there is
a direct assumption of the control of a specific individual rather than
the universal regulation of a class of people. Second, the TA powers
are a direct gateway to the criminal justice process. A power to stop
and search an individual is intended, in part, to discover evidence of
criminality. As with Mr Funke, albeit in a slightly different context,
individuals stopped under the TA power enjoy a Hobsonian choice.112
Either they submit to the search and its attendant risks or they resist
and face the possibility of a criminal conviction. Of course it is most
unlikely that the average citizen is aware of their exact legal position
and it is likely that, when faced with such a demand from a police
officer, he or she will comply rather than risk assault or arrest for
obstruction. Psychological compulsion in such circumstances can
make the restraint of liberty involuntary and thus amount to a de-
privation.113 Police stops are inherently coercive, both legally and psy-
chologically.114 It is, of course, important that in seeking to interpret
the right purposively we do not overshoot that purpose through an
overgenerous interpretation. Clearly, an overgenerous interpretation
of Article 5 to cover a large number of temporary and transitory
interferences with the right to liberty might hamper the effectiveness
of law enforcement. Therefore in the absence of direct coercion to the
108 Ibid. at para. 22.
109 Therens, above n.105 at para. 54.
110 Ibid. at para. 56.
111 Ibid.
112 Funke v France [1993] ECHR 0828/84.
113 Therens, above n.105 at para. 57.
114 All the more so for minority groups for whom they are particularly humiliating,
frightening and degrading. D. Tanovich, ‘Using the Charter to Stop Racial
Profiling’ (2002) 48 Osgoode Hall LJ 145 at 163.
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individual, Article 5 will clearly not apply. Thus, for example, when
you stop at the traffic lights Article 5 will not be engaged. But at the
same time we must not lose sight of the fact that a narrow inter-
pretation would render the protection afforded by Article 5 ‘theoret-
ical and illusory’.115 Moreover, as one of the principal purposes behind
Article 5 is to prevent arbitrary deprivations of liberty, setting a high
threshold for the engagement of Article 5 effectively removes from
scrutiny areas of low-level discretionary powers that have historically
been abused.
ii. Privacy
Leaving Article 5 to one side, with respect to the Article 8 right to
privacy a more expansive interpretation was also possible for, as
Feldman correctly observes, ‘a personal search in public is a particu-
larly embarrassing and upsetting experience . . . it is also a major
interference with people’s right to privacy’.116 The European Court of
Human Rights has repeatedly held that the right to privacy is a broad
concept ‘not susceptible to exhaustive definition’, depending in large
part on a determination of what reasonable expectation of privacy a
person enjoys in a particular context. The privacy interests protected
do not necessarily have to be the core ones envisaged by Article 8 for
that guarantee to be engaged. Thus in certain circumstances a person
will enjoy a right to privacy in public.117 Here American law offers an
interesting perspective. Textually the Fourth Amendment is, of course,
very different from the provisions of the ECHR: ‘The right of the
people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated’. Thus American jurisprudence
might seem to be of limited utility. However, the interests that it pro-
tects are broadly the same as those protected by the ECHR in this
context. Just as Articles 5 and 8 protect the liberty/security and pri-
vacy interests of the individual so does the Fourth Amendment.118 The
Fourth Amendment not only protects individuals from unreasonable
searches which interfere with their legitimate privacy interests but
also their liberty/security interests.119 For instance the US Supreme
Court has long held that ‘no right is held more sacred or is more
carefully guarded by the common law than the right of every indi-
vidual to the possession and control of his own person free from all
restraint or interference of others’.120 Thus in Terry v Ohio the US
Supreme Court held that the right to security guaranteed by the
115 See Chaskalson et al., above n. 70 at paras. 40–33 to 40–34.
116 D. Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales, 1st edn (OUP:
Oxford, 1993) 176.
117 Peck v United Kingdom [2003] ECHR 44647/98. Perry v United Kingdom [2004]
ECHR 63737/00 at paras. 36–7.
118 This is not surprising, given the American experience with the same Writs of
Assistance that bedevilled Wilkes and others.
119 Boyd v US 116 US 616 at 630 (1886).
120 Union Pacific Railway Co v Botsford 141 US 250 at 251 (1891).
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Fourth Amendment ‘belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of
our cities as to the home owner closeted in his study to dispose of his
secret affairs’.121 When a person is accosted by a police officer and
prevented from walking away then for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment he has been seized.122 The US Supreme Court has em-
phatically rejected a de minimis approach whereby such stops were
not to be considered arrests for the purposes of the Constitution. As
the Court observed, such stops and searches when conducted in the
street are not simply a petty indignity being ‘a serious intrusion on the
sanctity of the person which may inflict great indignity and arouse
strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly’.123 Further-
more, the US Supreme Court has held that bags and luggage enjoy
constitutional protection under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed bags
enjoy a greater expectation of privacy than cars for, as the Supreme
Court observed, ‘luggage is intended as a repository of personal ef-
fects’.124 It therefore seems reasonable that a person enjoys a reason-
able expectation of privacy for materials carried in a bag, which might
range from the mundane to the highly intimate.
Privacy rights under Article 8 are also implicated by the recording
and storage of data relating to the exercise of the powers under the
TA. Every such stop and search has to be recorded by law. In conduct-
ing the stop and search an officer will fill out Form 5090. On that form
he is required to note the ethnic group of the detainee, and he must
also ask for that person’s name, address and date of birth.125 Copies of
Form 5090 are subsequently fed into the ‘Stops Database’.126 No doubt
the ‘Stops Database’ is invaluable in assisting senior officers to com-
ply with their duty to produce reports on the use of stop and search
powers.127 However, this form of systematic recording and storage of
personal information relating to identity128 has been held by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights to infringe the right contained in Article
8(1),129 even if the information is in the public domain.130
121 392 US 1 (1968).
122 Ibid. at 16.
123 Ibid. at 17.
124 US v Chadwick 433 US 1 at 13 (1979).
125 PACE Code A Part 4.
126 See http://www.met.police.uk/foi/pdfs/policies/stop_and_account_sop.pdf.
127 PACE Code A Part 5.
128 Defined in Art. 2 of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data as ‘any information relating to an
identified or identifiable individual’. See further Amann v Switzerland [2000]
ECHR 27798/95 at para. 65.
129 Amann v Switzerland [2000] ECHR 27798/95, at paras. 65–7. Rotaru v Romania
[2000] ECHR 28341/95 at paras. 43–4. The Court has relied upon the provisions of
the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data when interpreting Art. 8 of the ECHR. < http:/
/conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm >
130 Rotaru v Romania [2000] ECHR 28341/95 at para. 43.
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Article 8 is, of course, a qualified right, and a breach of Article 8
would only follow if the TA could not be saved under Article 8(2). For
a measure to be upheld under Article 8(2) the state must show that the
impugned measure has a legitimate aim, is necessary in a democratic
society and is prescribed by law.131 In the shadow of recent terrorist
attacks no one could seriously argue that the TA does not pursue a
legitimate aim. The provisions of the Act are clearly justified as neces-
sary for the prevention of crime or to protect the national security
interests of the United Kingdom. That is not in doubt. However,
Article 8(2) does not grant a state carte blanche to do whatever it
considers necessary. In other words the powers must be propor-
tionate. However, where the powers wielded by the state are excep-
tional in nature then a higher standard of scrutiny is required. In Klass
v FRG,132 for example, the applicants had their communications inter-
cepted and monitored under German law. They complained that this
constituted an interference with the right to privacy guaranteed by
Article 8. The European Court of Human Rights did not agree, hold-
ing that the interference was justified. Nevertheless in dismissing the
application the European Court of Human Rights made a number of
important observations. To begin with the Court noted that in the age
of increasingly sophisticated terrorism a state must be able to take
measures to counter such threats effectively.133 Thus exceptional
powers may, at times, be justified. Nevertheless, the state does not
enjoy an unlimited discretion in such matters. Critically states must
not rely on pleas of necessity in the context of counterterrorism to
adopt measures that undermine democracy rather than protect it.
Such security measures are only tolerable in a democracy so far as is
strictly necessary.134 Exceptional measures must therefore be accom-
panied by effective safeguards to ensure that they are not abused.135
Simply because the context is challenging this does not license the
state to adopt permissive discretionary powers in the absence of ef-
fective safeguards.
iii. Freedom of Expression
Moreover, in practice the powers in the TA can act as a form of
indirect prior restraint.136 The immediate purpose of the powers is the
detection and prevention of terrorism. However, the powers can also
be used for a secondary purpose: that is, restraining speech, as the
131 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26 at para. 27,
per Lord Steyn.
132 Klass v FRG [1979] ECHR 5029/71.
133 Ibid. at para. 49.
134 Ibid. at para. 42.
135 Ibid. at paras. 49–50.
136 T. Emerson, ‘The Doctrine of Prior Restraint’ (1954) 20 Law and Contemporary
Problems 648 at 656.
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experiences of both Messrs Gillan and Wolfgang amply demon-
strate.137 Of course such an exercise of the power in ss. 44 and 45 TA is
unlawful. However, because the power is permissive it facilitates such
actions with, in practice, a considerable degree of impunity. In theory
an ex post facto remedy is available, though in practice it is of little
value especially to someone who wishes to attend a protest, and who
is impeded by an officer exercising the ss. 44 and 45 power.138 Indir-
ectly, it seems reasonable to conclude that the power can chill public
protest.139 This line of reasoning might seem somewhat strained to
some. However, it is worth bearing in mind the Cases of the General
Warrants. In Wilkes v Wood John Wilkes MP famously struck a blow
for liberty and legality in the face of unlimited powers of search and
seizure.140 The King’s Messengers and a constable entered Wilkes’s
house under the authority of a general warrant searching for evid-
ence to support seditious libel proceedings against the MP. Wilkes
subsequently brought and won an action for trespass. In the course of
his judgment Pratt CJ concluded that a general warrant which vested
in the representatives of the King a discretionary power to search
wherever their suspicions fell was ‘totally subversive of the liberty of
the subject’.141 In the related case of Huckle v Money142 which arose
from the same events, his lordship was even more forthright: ‘To enter
a man’s house by virtue of a nameless warrant in order to procure
evidence is worse than the Spanish Inquisition; a law under which no
Englishman would wish to live an hour; it was a most daring public
attack upon the liberty of the subject . . . I thought that the 29th
Chapter of Magna Charta, which is pointed against arbitrary power,
was violated’. These cases are interesting not simply because they
warn against unbridled discretionary police power, but also because
at their core they concern free speech. Although primarily concerned
with the legality of searches, the government would have been unable
to bring prosecutions for seditious libel without such documentary
evidence. Thus, as Stuntz contends, these cases were ‘classic First
Amendment cases in a system with no First Amendment and no ve-
hicle for direct substantive judicial review’.143 In this sense the TA
137 In the joined appeal in Gillan the appellant was so distraught at being stopped
and searched by the police that she left the area and did not attend the planned
protest.
138 In a free and democratic society there is a strong argument that citizens should
not be put to the expense and bother of bringing legal proceedings to vindicate
their basic constitutional rights.
139 In certain circumstances threats to prosecute have been viewed as inappropriate
prior restraint in the USA. See for example Council for Periodical Distributers v
Evans 642 Fed Sup 552 (MD Ala 1986). Reasoning affirmed 827 F 2d 1483 (11th Cir
1982).
140 (1763) 98 ER 489.
141 Wilkes v Wood (1763) 98 ER 489 at 498.
142 Huckle v Money (1763) 2 Wils 205 at 206.
143 W. J. Stuntz, ‘The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure’ (1996) 105 Yale Law
Journal 393 at 403. See also A. R. Amar, The Bill of Rights (Yale: New Haven, 1998)
75–6.
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power is thus a good example of the unintended effect of emergency
legislation. As Waldron notes, such emergency powers are often used
for other forms of state regulation unrelated to their original counter-
terrorist purpose.144 Yet in Gillan the possibility that the powers in the
TA might be used to restrict free speech were dismissed as remote.145
V. The Principle of Legality: the Problem of Permissive
Powers
The rule of law is an inherent part of the Convention scheme for the
protection of rights and freedoms. For legislative acts to comply with
the requirements imposed by the rule of law, a law must provide a
measure of protection against arbitrary interferences by public au-
thorities with Convention rights and freedoms.146 Nowhere is this
requirement more important than Article 5. The principle of legality is
an essential part of the architecture of Article 5. Article 5 states that
‘no one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and
in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law . . . [for] the lawful
arrest or detention of a person . . . in order to secure the fulfilment of
any obligation prescribed by law’. The House of Lords concluded that
because the obligation to stop was imposed by virtue of the TA this
complied with the requirement that the procedure be ‘prescribed by
law’. In a procedural sense their lordships were quite correct. How-
ever, the concept of legality contained in the Convention requires
more than simply legal authority to interfere with the liberty of the
individual.147 Such a narrow conception of legality would do little to
prevent the arbitrariness that Article 5 is intended to prevent. Thus
the European Court of Human Rights insists that legality has both
procedural and substantive aspects. The Convention requires that
the law be sufficiently accessible and precise in order that arbitrary
applications can be avoided.148 ‘Where the deprivation of liberty is
concerned’, the European Court of Human Rights concluded in
Khudoyorov v Russia, ‘it is particularly important that the general
principle of legal certainty be satisfied’.149 Permissive laws that au-
thorize interferences with liberty without any adequate conditions
precedent or controlling criteria are liable to fall foul of the legality
144 J. Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance’ (2003) 11 Journal of
Political Philosophy 191 at 205: ‘The protection of civil liberties is not just a matter
of cherishing certain freedoms that we particularly value . . . It is also a matter of
suspicion of power, an apprehension that power given to the state is seldom ever
used only for the purposes for which it is given, but is always and endemically
liable to abuse’.
145 Gillan [2006] UKHL 12 at para. 30, per Lord Bingham.
146 Tysiac v Poland [2007] ECHR 5410/03 at para. 112.
147 Elliot v Commissioner of Police [1997] 3 LRC 15 at 19, per Godwin CJ.
148 Amur v France [1998] 22 EHRR 553 at para. 50.
149 [2005] ECHR 6847/02 at para. 125.
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requirement. In the context of stop and search powers the usual safe-
guard has traditionally been the requirement of a ‘reasonable suspi-
cion’ on the part of the police officer.150 Such a criterion, in theory at
least, not only limits and controls the employment of intrusive powers
to situations where society’s interests in the detection of crime out-
weigh those of the individual, but also prevents abuse by providing an
objective standard against which an officer’s conduct can ex post facto
be measured. The TA lacks this criterion.151 The power in the TA is
limited only by Parliament’s command that it be used ‘only for the
purpose of searching for articles of a kind which could be used in
connection with terrorism’.152 The potential for hidden abuse is thus
largely because the law delegates to the officer a power with no ade-
quate basis of control. In the absence of an effective controlling cri-
terion the law makes Convention rights dependent on the exemplary
behaviour of police officers.
Before the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords counsel for the
applicants in Gillan had sought to argue that the power in the TA was
not ‘prescribed by law’ in that it was imprecise and vague. This argu-
ment was bound to fail for, as Lord Bingham observed, the TA ‘defines
and limits the powers with considerable precision’.153 However, both
counsel and the Bench missed the essential point with respect to
legality. The power is not vague; rather it is permissive. In this context
the key question is, ‘are there sufficient safeguards in the TA to protect
Convention rights?’. The permissiveness of a provision in these cir-
cumstances means rather than preventing abuse, it actually facilitates
it. The power may be used for purposes beyond those licensed by
Parliament without any effective legal oversight or redress. The
power authorizes arbitrary interferences with Convention rights that
are in effect not ‘prescribed by law’. In Vasileva v Denmark the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights held that a power to authorize deten-
tions should not be used in a punitive manner outside its intended
purpose.154 Similarly, in the South African case S v Z155 the applicants
were a number of juvenile offenders who had been sentenced to
reform school but because of systemic failures had been kept in penal
custody instead. The Eastern Cape High Court concluded that de-
privation of their liberty was arbitrary and thus, because it fell outside
the purpose for which it was imposed, inconsistent with the constitu-
tional guarantee to liberty.156 Indeed, with permissive powers the dan-
ger that they will be abused in this manner is even greater as the case
150 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v The United Kingdom [1989] ECHR 12244/86.
151 TA, s. 45(1)(b).
152 Ibid., s. 45(1)(a).
153 Gillan [2006] UKHL 12 at para. 35.
154 Vasileva v Denmark (2003) 15 BHRC 246.
155 CA 40/2003; 2004 (4) BCLR 410 (E).
156 Ibid. at para. 21, per curiam.
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of Walter Wolfgang illustrates.157 The detention of an individual for
heckling at a private function where there was no evidence of a ter-
rorist connection was clearly punitive and in no way connected with
the detection or prevention of terrorist crime. When a power can be
used for an inappropriate purpose it can be used arbitrarily.
Indeed, rather than vindicating the requirement inherent in the
Convention that restrictions on rights be in harmony with the prin-
ciple of legality, a permissive power subverts that principle. Such
powers allow for pretextual stops. In other words an individual is
stopped on the pretext of counterterrorist reasons but in reality the
stop is for other purposes. Such a power, in the absence of effective
safeguards, carries with it an ever-attendant danger that it will be
exercised arbitrarily. Although the term ‘arbitrary’ has been fre-
quently cited it has not received much judicial clarification either in
the European Court of Human Rights or courts applying the HRA.
However, what constitutes arbitrariness has received greater con-
sideration under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and domestic bills of rights based on its provisions.158
This jurisprudence is most instructive. At the outset the term arbitrary
was included in order to cover acts that may be lawful in the sense
that they were consistent with the law but which were nevertheless
unjust.159 Indeed, the term was deliberately included to ensure that
unjust and not simply unlawful acts were covered.160 Subsequently,
the Human Rights Committee (HRC) concluded that the term arbit-
rary ‘must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of in-
appropriateness, injustice and a lack of predictability’.161 To that list,
as Nowak suggests, might be added capriciousness and dispropor-
tionality.162 The much cited decision of the HRC in Hugo van Alphen v
The Netherlands provides a good illustration of the principle in action.
In Alphen the author was arrested on suspicion of forgery. He was
remanded in custody for nine weeks. The author alleged that his
157 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4291388.stm. Had Mr Wolfgang taken
proceedings against this prima facie unlawful use of the ss. 44 and 45 power, then
its scope may have been appropriately determined. On Padfield grounds the use
of the power in such a manner was surely unlawful? The discretionary powers in
the TA must be exercised in accordance with the policy and object of the Act,
namely the suppression of terrorism. Padfield v Ministry of Agriculture, Food and
Fisheries [1968] AC 997, 1030 per Lord Reid.
158 The term ‘arbitrary’ appears in both the UN Declaration and the ICCPR. See P.
Hassan, ‘ICCPR: Background and Perspective on Article 9(1)’ (1973) 3 Denver
Journal of International Law and Policy 153 at 181.
159 UN Doc E/Cn4/826/Rev1 (1964) para. 27. See R. Brody, ‘The United Nations
Creates a Working Group on Arbitrary Detention’ (1991) 85 American Journal of
International Law 709, 712–13.
160 See Hassan, above n. 157 at 173–83. For judicial confirmation see Hammond J in
Manga v Attorney General (2002) 2 NZLR 65 at para. 40.
161 See General Comment 8, adopted on 19 May 1989 (CCPR/C/21 Rev 1). Discussed
by the HRC in Van Alphen v Netherlands, views adopted on 23 July 1990,
Communication 305/1988.
162 M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (OUP: Oxford, 1993) 178.
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arrest and his detention were intended solely to place pressure upon
him to waive his absolute right to legal professional privilege and to
make incriminating statements. The HRC held that the ICCPR re-
quired more than the author’s treatment being authorized by law. His
treatment needed to be reasonable in the circumstances. Any remand
to custody had to be necessary, which in the author’s case it was not.
In fact it was arbitrary. Similarly, in A v Australia the author of the
complaint had been detained for a period of four years in a detention
camp for unlawful migrants. In determining that the detention was
arbitrary an examination of both the necessity and proportionality of
the detention was necessary.
Before national courts the approach of the HRC was approved by
the Privy Council in Fok Lai Ying v Governor in Council,163 although
without much discussion, and subsequently in more depth by the New
Zealand Court of Appeal in R v Goodwin.164 In Goodwin the appellant
had been convicted of the manslaughter of his infant daughter. Dur-
ing questioning, but while not under arrest, the appellant asked if he
could leave the police station. He was told that he was not free to go.
In a subsequent interview the appellant confessed. The appeal turned
on the admissibility of the confession and thus whether the appellant
had in fact been arrested or detained. The statement that the appel-
lant was not free to go induced a belief that he had to remain. He was
thus detained for the purposes of s. 22 of the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990. With respect to the question of arbitrary detention
Richardson J concluded that ‘whether an arrest or detention is arbit-
rary does not turn on its lawfulness but on the nature and extent of any
departure from the substantive and procedural standards involved . . .
an arrest or detention is arbitrary if it is capricious, unreasoned, with-
out reasonable cause, if it is made without reference to an adequate
determining principle or without following proper procedures’.165 The
principle of legality requires there to be a criterion or criteria against
which executive action must be exercised and can thereafter be
independently and impartially reviewed. If a discretionary power is
unfettered then there is a clear potential for abuse. In these circum-
stances it is not enough simply to say that such a permissive power is
justified because it assists in the detection and prevention of crime.
Those goals can be pursued in a way that does not require a power
that represents a dangerous exception to the supremacy of law.166
Similarly, the compatibility of a permissive power with Article 8(2)
was considered by the European Court of Human Rights in Herczeg-
falvy v Austria.167 The application concerned, in part, the interception
and control of Herczegfalvy’s correspondence by his legal guardian
163 [1997] HKLRD 810; (1997) 7 HKPLR 327.
164 (1993) 2 NZLR 153.
165 Ibid. at 189.
166 Dedman v The Queen (1985) 2 SCR 200 paras. 24–5, Dickson CJC dissenting.
167 [1993] ECHR 10533/83.
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and the psychiatric hospital where he was detained. Before the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights the applicant argued that the inter-
ception was not authorized by law and could not therefore be justified
under Article 8(2). In reply the Austrian state argued that the authority
for such interceptions could be found in the Austrian Civil Code and
the Hospitals Act. Section 51 of the Hospitals Act stated that a de-
tained patient ‘may be subject to restrictions . . . as to their contacts
with the outside world’.168 However, the law contained no indication
of any criteria that should be employed when exercising the power,
and any mechanism by which the decision could be reviewed ex post
facto.169 The European Court of Human Rights held that this lack of
precision was incompatible with the requirements of Article 8(2). The
Court concluded that ‘if a law confers a discretion on a public author-
ity it must indicate the scope of the discretion’.170 Moreover, in the
absence ‘of any details at all as to the kind of restrictions permitted or
their purpose, duration and extent or the arrangements of their re-
view . . . the provisions do not offer the minimum degree of protection
against arbitrariness required by the rule of law in a democratic
society’.171
The principle of legality thus has two important aspects, one pre-
ventative and one remedial. First, a discretion that has the potential to
interfere with Convention rights should not be so permissive that it
allows arbitrary interferences with rights to shelter behind it. Gen-
erally, a law that ‘confers a discretion must indicate the scope of that
discretion’.172 This is not the ‘impractical and unworkable prescrip-
tion’ that Lord Steyn thought it was.173 Where the legislature ‘has
given a plenary discretion to do whatever seems best in a wide set of
circumstances [then] there is no “limit prescribed by law”’,174 for
where there are ‘no standards governing the exercise of the discretion
granted by the [law] the scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement of the law’.175 Permissive powers in-
vite manipulation. They can be used for purposes for which they were
not granted, as ss. 44 and 45 of the TA demonstrate. While the legis-
lature might mandate their use for a specific purpose, operationally
because the power is expressed in permissive terms it can be used for
a range of other purposes. Such permissive powers facilitate the sotto
voce infringements of Convention rights in a manner that defeats the
very purpose of the Convention. For example, ss. 44 and 45 have been
168 Ibid. at para. 269.
169 In fact it was not clear from the text of the law who exactly was empowered to
make the decision.
170 Above n.166 at para. 89.
171 Ibid. at para. 96.
172 Silver v United Kingdom [1981] ECHR 5947/72 at para. 88.
173 R (S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 39 at para. 36, per Lord
Steyn.
174 Irwin Toy v Quebec [1989] 1 SCR 92 at para. 64.
175 Papachristou v City of Jackonsville 405 US 156 at 170 (1972).
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misused for public order purposes.176 Moreover, such powers deny
equality before the law. As they have no standard they can in effect
give free reign to the personal stereotypes or prejudices of the indi-
vidual officer in their application.177 Thus, a discretion must be con-
trolled by some objective criterion or criteria. As the US Supreme
Court noted in Brown v Texas when ‘a stop is not based on objective
criteria the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds
tolerable limits’.178 There needs to be a controlling criterion that guar-
antees ‘that an individual’s reasonable expectation to privacy is not
subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of the
officers in the field’.179 As White J observed the requirement of rea-
sonableness as a control on law enforcement searches was required
by the Constitution in order that the privacy and security interests
of the individual were not arbitrarily invaded.180 The requirement of
reasonableness represents a means of reconciling the competing
interests of the individual’s privacy and security from arbitrary inter-
ferences on the one hand and the government’s interests in the detec-
tion and prevention of crime on the other.181 In cases where the
legislature has departed from the reasonableness standard, then there
must be some mechanism containing an objective standard that
ensures that the individual’s privacy and security interests are not left
at the whim of the official exercising a standardless power. As the
French Conseil constitutionnel observed, ‘the performance of checks
entrusted by the law to the criminal investigation police must be
based on purely objective criteria, to the exclusion of all forms of
discrimination prohibited by the Constitution’.182 Similarly, in Re
Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society the Ontario Board of
Censors enjoyed a broad statutory power to censor films. There were,
however, no standards constraining the exercise of the censorship
discretion under the Theatres Act or any of the regulations made
under the authority of the Act. The Ontario Supreme Court held that:
The Charter requires reasonable limits that are prescribed by law; it is
not enough to authorize a board to censor or prohibit the exhibition of
any film of which it disapproves. That kind of authority is not legal, for it
depends on the discretion of an administrative tribunal. However dedic-
ated, competent and well-meaning the board may be, that kind of
regulation cannot be considered as ‘law’. It is accepted that law cannot
be vague, undefined, and totally discretionary; it must be ascertainable
176 M. Berlins, ‘When a slogan equals terrorism’ The Guardian (3 October 2005); see
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/homeaffairs/story/0,11026,1583685,00.html. ‘Heckler,
82, who dared called Straw a liar is held under terrorist law’, Daily Telegraph (30
September 2005); see http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml = /news/
2005/09/29/nlab29.xml.
177 Papachristou v City of Jacksonville 405 US 156 at 171 (1972).
178 443 US 52 (1979).
179 Ibid. at 56.
180 Ibid. at 53.
181 Terry v Ohio 392 US 1 (1968), 20–21 per Warren CJ.
182 Conseil constitutionnel Decision 93–325, 13 August 1993.
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and understandable. Any limits placed on the freedom of expression
cannot be left to the whim of an official; such limits must be articulated
with some precision or they cannot be considered to be law.183
This issue also arose before the South African Constitutional Court in
Dawood v Minister of Immigration.184 At issue in Dawood was the
validity of s. 29(9) of the South African Aliens Control Act. The Act
granted immigration officials a discretionary power to exclude for-
eign spouses from the country while their applications for immigra-
tion permits were considered, by refusing to renew or grant a
temporary permit in the meantime. The exercise of the discretionary
power had the potential to interfere with the constitutional right to
dignity that underpinned marriage. The issue for the Constitutional
Court was whether an unconstrained discretion could meet the re-
quirement that limits on constitutional rights be ‘prescribed by law’.
The Court held that a broad discretionary power could not constitute
a ‘law’ for the purposes of s. 36 of the Constitution, the limitation
clause. ‘It is an important principle of the rule of law that rules be
stated in a clear and accessible manner’, O’Regan J concluded, for ‘if
broad discretionary powers contain no express constraints, those
who are affected by the exercise of the broad discretionary powers
will not know what is relevant to the exercise of those powers or in
what circumstances that they are entitled to relief’.185 It is not enough
simply to say that the power can be exercised in a manner compatible
with the Constitution or read down into conformity. It is for the legis-
lature to provide guidance on when it is justifiable to limit rights
under a discretionary power either in the Act or via delegated legisla-
tion.186 Without criteria the exercise of the power will introduce an
element of arbitrariness that is inconsistent with the constitutional
protection of rights.187
Second, the presence of an objective standard enables effective ex
post facto review and scrutiny that will ensure the lawfulness of
any interference with Convention rights and provide a remedy if
necessary. Here a court must not be hampered in testing the necessity
of limits placed on Convention rights by rules such as the level of
scrutiny or the absence of an objective legal standard that provides
sufficient means to measure the legality of executive action. A stand-
ardless power is a good example of the latter. Decisions made under
its authority do not need to be justified under objective criteria. In-
stead they rest on subjective assessment made by the exercising of-
ficer which ex post facto a court is unable to scrutinize effectively in
terms of the Convention simply because no standard is required by
183 (1983) 31 OR (2d) 583 at 592 (Ont HC).
184 [2000] CCT 35/99; 2000 (8) BCLR 837. See also I. M. Raufenbach, ‘The Limitation of
Rights’ (2001) Journal of South Africa Law 617 at 635.
185 Dawood, above n. 183 at para. 47.
186 Dawood, above n. 183 at para. 53.
187 Dawood, above n. 183 at para. 58.
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the statute. There will inevitably be cases where an individual’s Con-
vention rights are infringed and yet he will be unable to obtain an
effective remedy. For instance in Smirnov v Russia188 the applicant
complained about a search of his apartment. The applicant was repre-
senting a number of individuals in proceedings although he was not
under suspicion himself. The search warrant issued by the Public
Prosecutor was broadly drafted granting the police an unrestricted
discretion in its execution.189 The police were free to seize what they
liked, and indeed did so. The European Court of Human Rights held
that not only was the search not carried out ‘with relevant and suffi-
cient grounds’ but there was also an absence of effective safeguards
to constrain the exercise of the discretion and to prevent abuse.190
VI. Legality and Discrimination
But perhaps the strongest argument that the safeguards are insuffi-
cient is the possibility that the standardless power might easily be
employed arbitrarily on the basis of racial prejudice. Any unbridled
discretion that has the potential to be employed in an arbitrary man-
ner has implications for the equal application of the law.191 Here the
Home Office’s statistics do not make for very comfortable reading. In
a typical year before the 7/7 attacks,192 an average of 8,120 stops and
searches were conducted by police forces in England and Wales.193 In
the Metropolitan area, the most ethnically diverse part of the United
Kingdom, there were 5,245 stop and searches under ss. 44 and 45,
leading to 57 arrests of which 2 were related to terrorism.194 Both
individuals arrested for terrorism were white. However, over a quar-
ter of those stopped and searched were not white.195 Of the 57 arrests
for offences other than terrorism, 26 individuals were from ethnic
minorities. Indeed from 2001–2005 a black or Asian individual was
over four times more likely to be stopped under the TA than a white
one.196 Not surprisingly since the 7/7 attacks the ss. 44 and 45 power
188 [2005] ECHR 71362/01.
189 Ibid. at para. 48
190 Ibid. at para. 49.
191 R v Belnavis [1997] 3 SCR 341 at para. 66, per La Forest J.
192 That is, the suicide bombings of the London transport network that occurred on
7 July 2005.
193 Taking an average of the years between 2000–2005 of the exercise of the TA
power in relation to pedestrians. Section 95 reports published before 2005 may be
accessed at http://www.homeoffice.govuk/rds/section951.html. From 2006 s. 95
reports are available from the Ministry of Justice: http://www.justice.govuk/docs/
race-and-cjs-stats-2006.pdf.
194 Home Office, Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System – 2004 (Home
Office: London, 2005) 35, Table 4.8.
195 1,443 (27.5 per cent).
196 The European Court of Human Rights held in DH v Czech Republic [2006] ECHR
57325/00 that ‘statistics are not by themselves sufficient to disclose a practice
which could be classified as discriminatory’ at para. 46.While the statistics are no
doubt flawed they do nevertheless reveal a pattern that should be cause for
concern. There is, of course, further evidence. The PACE Code contemplates such
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has been used more frequently.197 During 2005/2006 the annual total
of exercises of the TA power nearly doubled.198 Moreover, the year
2005/2006 showed a significant increase in the use of the TA power
against visible minorities.199
This pattern is not surprising. Code A of PACE states that ‘there
may be circumstances . . . where it is appropriate for officers to take
account of a person’s ethnic origin in selecting persons to be stopped
in response to a specific200 terrorist threat (for example some inter-
national terrorist groups are associated with particular ethnic identit-
ies)’.201 In other words, ss. 44 and 45 of the TA when read with the
PACE Code allow an officer to engage in racial profiling.202 There are,
Swiney suggests,203 two definitions of racial profiling. Under the nar-
row one racial profiling occurs when race is used as the sole criterion
for determining whom to stop and search. This is the definition
favoured by the House of Lords in Gillan. The second broader defini-
tion occurs when race is or ethnicity is one factor that is taken into
account amongst others. Indeed, race can influence decisions subcon-
sciously. This broader definition is favoured by the US Department of
Justice.204
The over-use of police powers against minority communities is, of
course, nothing new and since the Lawrence Inquiry purportedly is a
discrimination. And government ministers have made statements that certain
communities should expect to be singled out; see The Guardian (2 March 2005)
quoting Hazel Blears MP, then Minister of State at the Home Office. See also
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, Terrorism and the Community
Relations, Sixth Report of Session 2004–2005 HC-165 III (HMSO: London, 2005)
Ev. 98–99.
197 In fact between 2001–2005 there were 24,781 incidents when the TA power was
used against pedestrians. In 2005–2006 there were 19,064.
198 In 2004/2005 there were 10,941 stops and searches of pedestrians using the TA
power. In 2005/2006 there were 19,064. Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice
System – 2005 (Home Office: London, 2006) 34, Table 4.8. Statistics on Race and
the Criminal Justice System – 2006 (Ministry of Justice: London, 2007) 36, Table
4.8.
199 2005/2006 (percentages): White 61; Black 11; Asian 21; Other 6. 2004/2005
(percentages): White 74; Black 6; Asian 11; Other 5. Source: Statistics on Race . . .
2005, above n. 197 at 34, Table 4.8. Statistics on Race . . . 2006, above n. 197 at 36,
Table 4.8. Interestingly the figures for 2002/2003 are similar to those in 2006, a
legacy no doubt of the 9/11 attacks; Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice
System – 2003 (Home Office: London, 2004) 41.
200 Presumably specific in this context means just that and not some vague
generalized threat.
201 PACE Code A, para. 2.25.
202 S. Choudry and K. Roach, ‘Racial and Ethnic Profiling’ (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall LJ
1 at8.
203 C. F. Swiney, ‘Racial Profiling of Arabs and Muslims in the US: Historical,
Empirical, and Legal Analysis Applied to the War on Terrorism’, (2006) 3 Muslim
World Journal of Human Rights 1 at 7–8. See also D. Ramirez et al., ‘Defining
Racial Profiling in a Post 9/11 World’ (2003) 40 American Criminal Law Rev 1195 at
1206 where it is argued that ‘racial profiling exists where race or nationality is
used as a factor in determining whom to stop based on the belief that race,
ethnicity or national origin are possibly correlated with criminality’.
204 See Swiney, above n. 202 at 7.
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matter of great concern.205 Such communities have been subject to
arbitrary powers of stop and search before.206 In many ways ss. 44
and 45 are similar to the ‘sus’ laws that were repealed when empirical
evidence demonstrated their over-use against certain minority com-
munities.207 Where a stop is based solely on race it will be discrim-
inatory.208 As McIntyre J observed, ‘distinctions based on personal
characteristics attributed to an individual solely on the basis of asso-
ciation with a group will rarely escape the charge of discrimina-
tion’.209 In United States v Brignoni-Ponce the US Supreme Court held
that a stop made by a border patrol solely on the basis of racial
appearance was unconstitutional. While Mexican appearance could
be a relevant factor it did not on its own justify stopping individuals.210
Racial discrimination, as the European Court of Human Rights noted
in Timishev v Russia,211 is ‘a particularly invidious kind of discrimina-
tion and in light of its perilous consequences requires from the au-
thorities special vigilance and vigorous reaction’. The Council of
Europe urges contracting states to ensure that the principle of non-
discrimination is applied in the context of policing and, when dealing
with emergencies, the Council urges respect for the rule of law, and
an absence of discrimination coupled with adequate safeguards.212
‘There is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government’, concluded Jackson J, ‘than to require that
the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority
must be imposed generally . . . conversely, nothing opens the door to
arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and
choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation, and thus to
escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if
larger numbers were affected’.213 We might therefore have expected a
robust judicial response in Gillan to what appears to be a pattern of
205 Sir William MacPherson of Cluny, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, CM 4262–1,
1999) 6.
206 See e.g. C. F. Willis, ‘The Use, Effectiveness and Impact of Police Stop and Search
Powers’, Home Office Research and Planning Unit Paper 15 (1983). At 22 Willis
concludes ‘Blacks and particularly young black males, are much more likely to be
stopped and searched by the police than whites’.
207 Home Affairs Committee 1979–80, Race Relations and the ‘Sus’ Law, HC 559 (21
April 1980).
208 And on the authority of the Roma Rights case discriminatory, above n. 52. See
also Adulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 471.
209 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 143 at 174–5.
210 422 US 873 at 886–7 (1975). See also United States v Avery 137 F 3d 343 (6th cir,
1997). However, see United States v Martinez-Fuerte 428 US 543 at 563 (1976)
where the US Supreme Court permitted stops that were based largely on racial
appearance at fixed border checkpoints as opposed to roving stops by patrols.
See also United States v Bowen 500 F 2D 960 at 965 (9th Cir, 1974).
211 [2006] ECHR 55762/00 and 55974/00 at para. 207.
212 The Fight against Terrorism – Council of Europe Standards, 2nd edn (Council of
Europe Publishing: Strasbourg, 2004) Principle 11.
213 Railways Express Agency v New York 336 US 106 at 466–7 (1949).
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discriminatory stops and searches.214 Article 14 is after all an im-
portant weapon in preventing the development of patterns of discrim-
ination within society. Article 14 is intended to shield individuals from
objectification based on stereotypes, particularly those who have suf-
fered such stereotyping in the past.215 Profiling has a pernicious effect
in practice. It encourages people to deal with persons from different
races as ‘black’, ‘white’, ‘Asian’ and so on, rather than individuals
worthy of equal concern and respect.216 However, because of the
standardless sweep of the power in ss. 44 and 45 there is a danger that
it might act as a mechanism for giving effect to crude stereotyping.
Those who possess the crude proxy characteristic, namely certain
racial origins, are taken to possess the material characteristic. The
proxy is based on a crude sociological generalization for which there
is little evidence, and creates an atmosphere where crude pejorative
stereotypes will be employed either consciously or unconsciously.217
Of course, discrimination on the basis of race cannot be justified on
utilitarian grounds.218 Everyone is entitled to be treated as an indi-
vidual and not as a statistical unit.219 On the facts the Roma Rights case
would be good authority for arguing that the current practice of stop
and search under ss. 44 and 45 is directly discriminatory being ‘in-
herently and systematically discriminatory on racial grounds’.220
However, in Gillan Lord Brown was able to distinguish the Roma
Rights case on the grounds that an individual’s ethnic profile was not
the sole factor in determining whether to stop and search under ss. 44
and 45. Racial origins were simply part of an overall profile.221 The
police would need to have regard to other factors when deciding to
stop and search under the authority of ss. 44 and 45. In other words
there was no intentional discriminatory use of the power in a racially
motivated manner. Thus the House of Lords saw little difficulty in
employing race as in effect a key element of a terrorist profile, al-
though some members of the Appellate Committee were clearly
troubled by the manifest discrimination. Lord Brown concluded that it
was ‘inevitable that so long as the principal threat [is from al Qaeda]
. . . a disproportionate number of those stopped and searched under
214 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557 at para. 19, per Lord Walker. See also
C. R. Sunstein, ‘Fear and Liberty’ (2004) 71 Social Research 1 at 20–2.
215 Miron v Trudel (1995) 29 CRR (2D) 189 at 207–8. Andrews v Law Society of British
Columbia (1989) 56 DLR 1 at 34, per Wilson J.
216 M. Perry, ‘Disproportionate Impact Theory’ (1977) 125 U Penn LR 540 at 550.
217 Arguably ‘institutional racism’ is a manifestation of unconscious racism.
218 R (Carson) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2005] UKHL 37, [2006] 1 AC
173, per Lord Hoffmann. His lordship’s remarks were directed at discrimination
on the basis of sex rather than race, but are equally applicable in the latter
context. Discriminatory treatment on prohibited grounds ‘offends the notion that
everyone is entitled to be treated as an individual and not a statistical unit’.
219 Ibid.
220 Above n. 52 at para. 38, per Lord Steyn.
221 Gillan [2006] UKHL 12 at para. 91, per Lord Brown.
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW
32
s. 44 TA will be of Asian appearance’.222 To many, no doubt, Lord
Brown’s statement appears to be an incontrovertible fact. For in-
stance, all but one of the 7/7 bombers were British Asians. However,
simply because one set of terrorists fits the profile it does not mean
that future ones will. The key question here, surely, is are we simply
succumbing to the temptation to fall into pejorative stereotyping?
Indeed, how strong is the correlation between the proxy trait, namely
race, and the material one, that is a propensity to commit terrorist
crime? It might be argued that as profiling potential offenders is a
well-established law enforcement practice it should be used in this
context; after all profiling is seen by many as a reliable and effective
investigatory tool.223 But the key question in this context is how ra-
tional is profiling? By focusing on race we are ignoring an important
fact, namely that Islamic terrorism is driven by a fundamentalist inter-
pretation of a religion. This form of terror is not linked exclusively to a
particular ethnicity in the same way, for example, as Irish terrorism
was.224 The traditional paradigm of viewing terrorism as connected to
territorial disputes is not appropriate post 9/11.225 Moreover the al-
Qaeda network is simply not a terrorist group like the IRA. For in-
stance, while some of Bin Laden’s aims might have a territorial
element to them, the Islamist groups that form the al-Qaeda network
are not committed to the liberation of an ethnic homeland from an
occupier. The motivation is of a different order, springing from a
divine injunction to defend one’s religion from its enemies. Islamic
terrorists will inevitably be a heterogeneous group of nationalities and
ethnicities, as the patchy records of those trained in al-Qaeda’s
Afghan camps reveal. In contrast to Irish republican terrorism, for
instance, where the majority of operatives were Irish or of Irish de-
scent, Islamist terrorists could literally be anyone. Ethnic targeting
will therefore only ever be limited in effect. It is not uncommon for
white, mixed race and black individuals to convert to Islam. Some will
inevitably become Salafists or Islamists.226 During the civil war in
Yugoslavia a significant number of Bosnian mujahideen were not
222 Ibid. at para. 80.
223 D. Tanovich, ‘Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling’ (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall LJ
145 at 157–8.
224 A recent internal review by the government concluded that ‘it is difficult to
generalise about the profile of young British Muslims who are attracted to
Islamist terrorist activity either in the UK or overseas’: UK Foreign and
Commonwealth Office/Home Office, Draft Report on Young Muslims and
Extremism. (April 2004). Available online at http://www.globalsecurity.org/
security/library/report/2004/muslimext-uk.htm.
225 There may of course be a coincidence between the two, as in Kashmir. But Islamic
terrorists do not subscribe to notions of states and sovereignty for the simple
reason they believe that the world belongs not to men but God.
226 Broadly speaking Salafists are Muslims who believe that society should be
ordered as it was in the time of Mohammed, in accordance with the Qur’an and
hadith (the record of the words and deeds of Mohammed). Islamists are a similar
group in that they too hope to establish a purely Islamic society. However,
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Arab-Afghans but recruits from the West including converts.227 Such
a convert was of course Richard Reid, the so-called ‘shoe bomber’
who attempted to commit mass murder by blowing up a trans-
Atlantic flight with an explosive device concealed in his shoes. Reid is
of mixed race being of British and Jamaican descent.228 Similarly in
November 2005 a white, former Christian, middle-class Belgian na-
tional, Muriel Degauque,229 took part in a suicide attack against US
forces in Baghdad killing six others in the process. In fact there is
growing evidence that the suicide bombers who attack cities such as
London in the future will not be Asian in appearance but white. The
presence in the alleged August 2006 conspirators of white converts
should not be a surprise to anyone. Faced with an organized offensive
against it al-Qaeda has simply adapted its tactics. In 2005 The Global
Media Front, a recognized mouthpiece of al-Qaeda, published a docu-
ment on the Internet indicating that al-Qaeda intended to use white
converts to undertake attacks. Al-Qaeda refers to such people as
‘Rakan Bin Williams’. The site went on to place the use of such con-
verts in the context of al-Qaeda’s strategy of surprise and adaptation:
‘They restricted the Arab and were attacked by those from Pakistan
. . . you will not be able to find any solution because our next soldier
cannot be put under surveillance or restricted in his movements or
arrested’.230 No doubt for this very reason the recruitment of white
westerners has become an attractive tactic for al-Qaeda. The possibil-
ity of this threat has been recognized by the government. In an in-
terim government report, Young Muslims and Extremism, the authors
noted that whilst many Muslims ‘have grown up in Muslim house-
holds, a significant number come from liberal, non-religious Muslim
backgrounds, or only converted to Islam in adulthood . . . these con-
verts include white British nationals and those of West Indian extrac-
tion’.231 Arguably white recruits are more often susceptible to the
jhadi message. Converts to Islam lack the Arabic language skills so
necessary to be able to read the Koran properly,232 and thus are open
Islamists may seek to co-opt the institutions of the modern state to achieve their
ends, something that a Salafist would reject. A useful discussion of the various
Islamic groupings can be found in Jason Burke, al-Qaeda (London: Penguin,
2004) 40.
227 E. F. Kohlmann, al-Qadea’s Jihad in Europe (Berg: Oxford, 2004) 95.
228 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1731568.stm.
229 See http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2092–1902761,00.html.
230 M. al-Shishani, ‘Westerners Being Recruited by al-Qadea’ (2005) 2 Terrorism
Focus 23; http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/
article.php?articleid = 2369849.
231 It is difficult to generalize about the profile of young British Muslims who are
attracted to Islamist terrorist activity either in the UK or overseas. Backgrounds
and motivation to undertake terrorist or related activity vary. They range from
foreign nationals now naturalized and resident in the UK arriving mainly from
North Africa and the Middle East, to second and third generation British citizens
whose forebears mainly originate from Pakistan or Kashmir.
232 The Koran, being the word of God, must be studied in its seventh century
classical Arabic to be read correctly.
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to unquestioning adoptions of more extreme interpretations of the
various Sura (chapters). Moreover, without a network of Muslim
friends and family who can offer a different interpretation of Islam,
they are left with the version offered by their recruiters.233 For al-
Qaeda groups the attraction is obvious. White recruits are better able
to practise taqiyya234 and blend seamlessly into what is after all their
own society. It would be a rare lucky break indeed if ss. 44 and 45
intercepted such a person, as Lord Carlile observes.235 But then stop
and search in general has rarely been an effective means of appre-
hending offenders.236
Moreover, the irrationality of using race as a proxy trait is a good
example of probability neglect. Not surprisingly we are gripped by a
degree of fear when we think about terrorism. In such circumstances
we naturally tend to focus our thoughts on the adverse outcomes
while ignoring the likelihood of their occurrence. Such neglect of
probability ‘can produce significant problems for law and regula-
tion’.237 The majority of us have no idea how probable it is that we will
be injured or killed in a terrorist incident. In the absence of this
information we rely on our own perceptions. How easy is it for us to
recall or visualize a salient example of the event in question? Images
of terrorism are readily available. One can quite easily recall the im-
ages of the aircraft hitting the World Trade Centre in New York or the
exploded bus in Tavistock Square in London. Terrorists of course
realize this for, as Sunstein observes, such people (whether they know
it or not) ‘show a good understanding of the availability heuristic
simply because a highly publicised terrorist attack238 is likely to create
more fear than base statistics warrant’.239 Although we are far more
likely to die in a car crash or from chronic illness we tend to perceive
233 P. Sookhdeo, Understanding Islamic Terrorism (Issac Publishing: Pewsey, 2004)
178.
234 The practice of disguising one’s beliefs or intentions while remaining true to
Islam.
235 Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, Report on the Operation in 2004 of the Terrorism Act
2000 (HMSO: London, 2005) para. 115.
236 J. Lea, ‘The MacPherson Report and the Question of Institutional Racism’ (2000)
39 Howard Journal 219 at 230. J. Millar et al., ‘The Impact of Stops and Searches
on Crime and the Community’, Home Office Police Research Series 127 (2000)
19–27.
237 C. Sunstein, ‘Probability Neglect, Emotions, Worst Cases and the Law’ (2004) 112
Yale LJ 61 at 63.
238 See further L. Richardson, What Terrorists Want – Understanding the Terrorist
Threat (John Murray: London, 2006). At 101 Richardson observes ‘Since the days
of the Zealots terrorists have understood the value of publicity . . . no spectacular,
however, quite compares with the image of aircraft ramming into the Twin
Towers and the subsequent collapse of those bastions of American capitalism’.
239 C. Sunstein, ‘Hazardous Heuristics’ (2003) 70 Uni Chicago L Rev 751 at 762. The
availability heuristic is a cognitive bias that causes people to base their future
prediction of events on the ease with which salient examples come to mind.
Events that are vivid and shocking create a stronger emotional impact, and are
thus recalled with greater ease. However, such events might be statistically
improbable or infrequent. In other words events that are more available are more
likely to be judged as probable. See A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, ‘Availability: A
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terrorism as a more pressing threat to ourselves and society, and in
light of this it is easier to justify extraordinary measures to deal with
it. We allow our strong emotions, principally fear, to drive out qual-
itative judgments,240 and spend a disproportionate amount of time
planning for worst-case scenarios. Thus we tend to focus on high risk
information believing it to be more compelling and accurate, and plan
our response accordingly. For instance in the wake of 9/11 in the
United Kingdom the government conducted exercises based on
scenarios involving the use of biological and nuclear weapons.241 In
September 2003 the government undertook Exercise Osiris II at
London’s Bank Underground station simulating a chemical attack.
However, when the much anticipated attack came on 7 July 2005 it
was conducted by a small cadre of bedsit fanatics wielding devices
manufactured from household chemicals.242 In such a climate it is
inevitable that representative institutions will neglect probability too.
In fact ‘a good deal of legislation and regulation can be explained
partly by reference to probability neglect when emotions are running
high’.243 The legislative response to terrorism carries with it a severe
risk of probability neglect.244 Sensationalist saturation media coverage
of terrorism hardly helps, triggering the availability heuristic.245 Over-
reaction is inevitable, with broad sweeping and largely ineffective
emergency powers being the result. Sections 44 and 45 of the TA are a
good example.
Furthermore, the discriminatory effect of the operation of ss. 44
and 45 of the TA is also counterproductive.246 If society as a whole is to
reduce the risk of Islamist terrorism then moderate Muslims need to
be supported. However, the over-use of emergency powers creates a
danger that Muslims will be stereotyped and alienated. In the end,
faced with what is perceived to be a partial and aggressive use of
police powers, there is a danger that the Muslim community will feel
stigmatized, and become increasingly angry and alienated. In such
Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability’ (1973) 5 Cognitive Psychology
207 at 208. See also D. Kahneman,P. Slovic, and A.Tversky, Judgment under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,
1982).
240 See Sunstein, above n. 234 at 70.
241 Full details of Exercise Osiris and its outcome can be found on the UK Resilience
website: http://www.ukresilience.info/preparedness/exercises/londoncasestudies/
osiris.aspx.
242 Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 (HMSO,
HC 1087), paras. 7–13 and 59–60. With worst-case scenarios we assume that
planning for these eventualities is sufficient for all such events. In fact by focusing
on the worst case we divert resources and attention away from less available but
more probable events thus making them more likely.
243 Sunstein, above n. 234 at 97–8.
244 Sunstein, above n. 234 at 100.
245 An intense emotional reaction to a very low probability event. See A. Tversky, . &
D. Kahnemann, ‘Judgments of and by representativeness’ in Kahneman et al.,
Judgment under uncertainty, above n. 236 at 84–100.
246 Equally, ss. 44 and 45 do not encourage intelligence-led policing but instead
encourage the police to rely on physical appearance.
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circumstances it is probable that we will lose the support of the very
community we need to tackle this problem effectively.247 Individuals
who see the police and criminal justice system as unfair are unlikely to
assist the police by informing on suspicious activity or indeed testify-
ing.248 Arguably, in the long term such crude powers can hinder law
enforcement by undermining the legitimacy of the police. Disillu-
sioned young men are of course the very people that terrorists seek to
recruit, especially at a time where the concept of Islamic Umma has
attained greater potency in general, and for some the bonds of
Tawheed are strengthening.249 Moreover, in the post-Lawrence world
the use of such powers in a discriminatory manner does nothing to
improve relations between the police and other minority communities
who are not seen directly as the source of the threat. For ordinary
people police legitimacy is driven more by their perceptions of pro-
cedural fairness than by instrumentalities such as their effectiveness
in fighting crime.250 The legitimacy of the police is, in the public’s
mind, linked to judgments on the fairness with which the police make
decisions and exercise their authority. Indeed, unequal treatment is a
major source of dissatisfaction.251 Regardless of their ethnicity ‘people
cooperate with the police when they view the police as legitimate’.252
Unfairness or perceived unfairness will lead to alienation, defiance
and non-cooperation.253 Somewhat depressingly we have been here
before. In 1983 a Home Office research paper concluded that ‘the
repeated use of stop and search powers can have an adverse effect on
police/community relations to the point where any contact with the
police comes to be seen as . . . a sign of official hostility’.254 The report
went on to conclude that ‘without a secure base of community sup-
port the use of powers of this kind, however extensive or circum-
scribed, rapidly becomes burdensome and ineffective’.255 Indeed, this
has been a persistent concern of both inquiries and researchers in the
intervening 25 years.256 Moreover, the perception of a fundamentally
247 See e.g.T. Ghaffur, ‘The Impact of Culture, Customs and Race in Contemporary
Policing’ 7 August 2006 NBPA Conference. Available from http://www.nbpa.
co.uk/.
248 S. J. Ellman, ‘Racial Profiling and Terrorism’ (2003) 22 NY Law School Journal of
Human Rights 305 at 335.
249 The Umma are the community of the faithful. Tawheed is, in essence, the core
tennets of Islam.
250 Jason Sunshine, ‘The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping
Support for Policing’ (2003) Law and Society Review 513, 524.
251 Ibid. at 516.
252 Ibid. at 537.
253 Ibid. at 519.
254 See Willis, above n. 205 at 23.
255 Ibid.
256 Sir William MacPherson, above n. 204 at para. 6.45(b): ‘Whilst we acknowledge
and recognise the complexity of this issue and in particular the other factors
which can be prayed in aid to explain the disparities, such as demographic mix,
school exclusions, unemployment, and recording procedures, there remains, in
our judgment, a clear core conclusion of racist stereotyping’. J. Millar et al., above
n. 233 at 47. Lea, above n. 233 at 228.
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unfair criminal justice system contributes to broader racial divisions
in society.257 When politicians talk of ‘redressing the balance’ the costs
of such adjustments do not fall evenly across society. As Waldron has
pointed out, it is often minority communities that carry the heaviest
burden.258 Of course, beyond the specific context of terrorism there is
the wider question of the role of government in preventing discrim-
ination. Arguably in a free and democratic society government has a
special duty not only to ensure that discrimination on prohibited
grounds is prevented but also to act as a teacher. Where the govern-
ment is seen to act in a discriminatory manner it acts in a way that not
only undermines its own efforts to prevent such action in private
parties, it also acts inconsistently with its own laws and policies in-
tended to eradicate discrimination. Not only are the costs of such
action higher and more hidden than in the private sector,259 discrim-
inatory action by the government is likely to be observed by the wider
population and this will inevitably sow the seeds of distrust if not fear
of members of the principally targeted group. In such an atmosphere
discrimination will flourish.260 In these circumstances we need to be
especially sure that emergency powers are both necessary and
effective.
However, proving direct racial discrimination would be difficult. It
would involve an admission by an officer than he had relied on racial
stereotypes in the exercise of his discretionary powers.261 But of
course, under vague discretionary powers people can be stopped at
whim, and where there is no controlling criterion then no reason will
need to be given.262 Be that as it may, while the exercise of ss. 44 and
45 might not constitute direct discrimination it might nevertheless
constitute indirect discrimination. In Jordan v United Kingdom the
European Court of Human Rights concluded that ‘where a general
policy or measure has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a par-
ticular group it is not excluded that this may be considered as discrim-
ination notwithstanding that it is not specifically aimed or directed at
that group’.263 The power in ss. 44 and 45 is facially neutral. It does not
single out any particular group for differential treatment.264 It is silent
257 D. Cole ‘Racial Profiling and the Future of the Criminal Law’ (1999) 26 Human
Rights 2 at 3.
258 Above n.143 at 210.
259 N. Lund, ‘The Conservative Case against Racial Profiling’ (2002–2003) 66 Alb Law
Review 329, 329–331.
260 There is considerable evidence that intolerance and prejudice are primarily a
function of threat perception; see Christina Wells, ‘Fear and Loathing in
Constitutional Decision Making’, (2005) Wisconsin Law Review 115, 158 and
163–8.
261 R v Brown (2003) 64 OR (3d) 161 at 254.
262 R v Ladoucour [1990] 1 SCR 1257, per Justice Sopinka. See also the judgment of
Tarnopolosky JA in the Ontario Court of Appeal in the same case (R v Ladoucour
(1987) 59 OR (2d) 688).
263 Jordan v United Kingdom [1999] ECHR 27746/94 at para. 154.
264 Leaving aside for the sake of argument the impact of PACE Code A.
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as to whom it should be applied. However, indirect discrimination is
intended to deal with discrimination that hides behind neutral criteria.
Although the law in its form is non-discriminatory it is nevertheless
discriminatory in its operation as the burden of its operation falls
more heavily on members of discrete and insular minorities. In other
words, under ss. 44 and 45 there is a differential impact on members
of protected groups. Stops and searches are not intentionally discrim-
inatory. The police intend to intercept terrorists preparing to commit
crimes or to gather intelligence. However, in effect the operation of
the power is to single out specific groups for special treatment. As the
statistics make clear, the operation of ss. 44 and 45 is a paradigm case
of indirect discrimination, for the powers when applied interfere with
the Convention rights of a higher number of members of racial
minorities than whites. In effect it is discriminatory. The European
Court of Human Rights has cautioned against simply relying upon
statistical analysis as sufficient to prove a prima facie case of discrim-
ination.265 However where ‘undisputed official statistics’ reveal
indirect discrimination then this is sufficient proof.266
Once a prima facie case of indirect discrimination is made out by a
claimant, then the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to demon-
strate that there has been no discrimination, and if there has, that it
can be objectively justified.267 For ss. 44 and 45 to be objectively justi-
fied within the terms of the Convention they will need to pursue a
legitimate aim in a proportionate manner.268 However, there is an
immediate problem here. There is no express legal authority for such
profiling. A similar situation arose in the South African case City
Council of Pretoria v Walker.269 Here the Council differentiated be-
tween categories on the basis of race by charging, in a different
manner, residents of different suburbs. The effect was to discriminate
indirectly against the residents of predominantly white suburbs. The
Constitutional Court held that the decision of the Council to establish
such a charging regime was not authorized by law, either expressly or
by necessary implication. Therefore, the Council’s policy was not
authorized by law and it could not seek to justify its policy.270 Argu-
ably, it is the case that profiling under the TA is not authorized by law
and is thus unlawful.
265 Jordan v United Kingdom [1999] ECHR 27746/94 at para. 154.
266 Hoogendijk v The Netherlands [2005] ECHR 58641/00 (dec.) at 21–2. D.H. v The
Czech Republic [2007] ECHR 57325/00 at para. 180.
267 Timishev v Russia [2005] ECHR 55762/00 at para. 57.
268 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom [1985] ECHR 9214/80 at para.
72. In this context there is clearly some overlap between the first limb of the Daly
test that ‘the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a
fundamental right’ and the requirement that a measure pursue a legitimate aim.
See further Lord Steyn in Daly [2001] UKHL 26 at para. 27.
269 (CCT8/97) 1998 (3) BCLR 257.
270 Ibid. at para. 82.
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Leaving the issue of legality to one side, few would seriously doubt
that the prevention and detection of terrorism is a legitimate aim.
Although the ss. 44 and 45 power was originally enacted in 1996 as an
expeditious response to what is now an historic threat, it has now
become an important weapon in counterterrorist policing post 9/11.
There can be no doubt of the threat posed by contemporary terror-
ism. Given the brutal and bloody nature of terrorism the adoption of
an effective approach to counterterror policing that is preventative is
both highly desirable and wholly understandable.
If we accept that some form of special powers are thus essential to
deal with this terrorist threat, the question then becomes, which ones
are likely to be effective? In other words, is there a rational connection
between the legitimate aim and the legislative means chosen to meet
it? Sections 44 and 45, we are told, are an important part of the
counterterrorist arsenal. For example, ACPO claims that ss. 44 and 45
are an invaluable tool because they deter and disrupt terrorists, par-
ticularly their reconnaissance of potential targets.271 Indeed, the
House of Lords was itself impressed by similar witness statements to
that end. The ss. 44 and 45 powers remained necessary to disrupt
terrorist activity and to gather intelligence.272 Lord Bingham thus felt
able to conclude that, in light of the statement, there was ‘no evidence
of any kind to contradict or undermine this testimony’.273 In doing so
Lord Bingham followed a long line of authority in English law
whereby the judiciary adopt a highly deferential attitude in cases in-
volving national security and effectively accept the ipse dixit of the
executive. However, the Home Office’s own statistics tell a different
story. In fact a thorough examination of the statistics brings into
question the issue of whether the power is effective, and thus neces-
sary. For example, between 2001–2005 there were 24,781 stops and
searches under the power. These stops resulted in 364 arrests for
offences other than those connected with terrorism, and just 36 for
those related to terrorism. Unfortunately, we do not know how many
of the 36 arrests for terrorism resulted in a conviction for such of-
fences. As has already been noted, since the 7/7 attacks the TA power
has been used more frequently. Consequently the number of arrests
has risen. In 2005/2006, 19,064 exercises of the TA power resulted in
59 arrests for terrorist related offences. This 0.3 per cent success rate
represented an improvement on the previous combined average of
0.14 per cent.274 Nevertheless, this success rate can hardly be said to
represent a power that is so effective that it can be described as
necessary. Such a low success rate is not surprising given the diffi-
culty in combating contemporary terrorism, where the protagonists
271 Memo to House of Commons Home Affairs Commitee, Terrorism and Community
Relations HC 165-II - Evidence.
272 Gillan [2006] UKHL 12 at para. 17 (statement of Catherine Byrne).
273 Ibid.
274 Above nn. 196 and 198.
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are indistinguishable from their law-abiding compatriots. The in-
escapable conclusion must be that the power in the TA is largely a
symbolic one given its limited impact on improving security. Be that
as it may, it is tempting to conclude that had there been an instance
where ss. 44 and 45 have succeeded in foiling an attack it would have
been referred to. In the absence of specific evidence the suspicion
must be, that as with ordinary powers of stop and search under
PACE, the impact of stop and search in disrupting and deterring
terrorist crime is limited.275 Instead, as with PACE, the TA powers are
in large part directed at controlling disorderly and dangerous groups
rather than actually detecting crime.276 In this context race is used as a
trigger for surveillance and control. Moreover, the statistics seem to
indicate that these provisions are, par excellence, what Thomas calls
‘comfort legislation’277 whose benefits are primarily psychological.278
The presence of police officers stopping and searching people in pub-
lic places is no doubt to some people reassuring. But the price for
providing such reassurance is the significant expansion of policing
and police powers.279 Equally, no specific evidence was presented
showing how ss. 44 and 45 have yielded usable intelligence. More-
over, there is a further ‘strong argument to be made that state-
sanctioned discriminatory treatment of vulnerable and disadvantaged
groups should never be permitted even if it could be defended as
rational’.280 Not only are there more efficient ways of collecting in-
telligence, the power is most unlikely to disrupt or prevent terrorist
attacks. The correlation between the goal of collecting intelligence
and the means chosen to achieve it seems implausible in light of the
statistics.281
Finally for ss. 44 and 45 to be objectively justified, the means chosen
to limit the right should do so no more than is necessary to achieve
the objective. In Gillan the limitation was imposed not by the statute
but by its application. As we have already seen, a vague, over-broad
power has the potential to limit rights and freedoms more than is
necessary because the law does not clearly demark or control the
limits of the power. Under such a power limits on Convention rights
will vary with every application. In such a context the key question is
what, if any, safeguards have been put in place to prevent abuse? For
instance, what guidance has been issued on the lawful exercise of the
power? This is not merely some academic exercise. The potential for
275 See Millar et al., above n. 233 at 19–47.
276 See Lea, above n. 233 at 230.
277 P. Thomas, ‘9/11: USA and UK’ (2003) Fordham Law Journal 1193 at 1198.
278 See Waldron, above n.143 at 209.
279 L. Zedner, ‘Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror’ (2005) 32 JLS 507 at 517.
280 D. Tanovich, ‘Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling’ (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall LJ
145 at 161.
281 It may however be the case that additional evidence might satisfy the
requirements of evaluative rationality.
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abuse of security legislation has a ‘long if somewhat tawdry pedi-
gree’.282 Indeed, the need for safeguards is probably greater in times
of crisis when the temptation is to place the exigencies of security
before all else. In the context of the TA clearly Parliament intended
that the power be used only in connection with activity related to
terrorism. Yet the power has resulted predominantly in arrests for
crimes not connected with terrorism. Thus Parliament or the courts
should put in place incentives and structures to ensure that discre-
tionary powers are not abused. In fact Parliament did not put in place
any effective safeguards to prevent the abuse of this power. Rather
than addressing the issue of whether and indeed when racial profiling
should be used, thereby surrounding the power with proper safe-
guards, the PACE codes were amended. According to paragraph 2.25
of PACE Code A such action is justified because certain international
terrorist groups are associated with particular ethnic groups. This
presumably is what the Code means by an ‘objective threat’. The Code
is silent on how the threat is to be determined. Instead it is left to the
various police forces to how the assessment is to be made. The Metro-
politan Police Force has issued Police Standard Operating Procedures
to determine how that assessment is to be made.283 This is surely
significant, for nothing in the TA sanctions racial profiling. Yet the
PACE Code contemplates treating different classes of people differ-
ently. Arguably, this issue should have been addressed directly by
Parliament.
It is nonetheless important to recognize that safeguards are not
limited to ensuring that the power is excised in a manner compatible
with Convention rights. Ex post facto safeguards have a role to play
too. The House of Lords concluded that an action in the county court
would provide an effect remedy for an abuse of the power. There are,
however, a number of problems with this. First, the power is unlikely
to be used against the economically favoured or powerful. It is most
likely to be used against the disadvantaged.284 Second, the abuse of
ss. 44 and 45 is likely to remain largely hidden. The innocent will
rarely pursue a claim. Litigation is expensive and time-consuming.
Moreover, many of those stopped simply lack faith in the legal
system to vindicate their rights.285 Third, the traditional remedies of
282 See Waldron, above n. 143 at 203.
283 See e.g. the London Metropolitan Police Force’s Search Powers under Sections
44/45 Terrorism Act Standard Operating Procedures at 14; http:/
/www.met.police.uk/foi/pdfs/policies/stop_and_search_s44_tact_2000_sop.pdf.
284 R v Landry [1986] 1 SCR 145 at para. 87, per La Forest J: ‘There is another cause
for concern in granting such a vague discretion. It is unlikely to be used as much
against the economically favoured or powerful as against the disadvantaged. It is
interesting that the home in Davis v Russell, supra, was described as lodgings,
and those in Eccles v Bourque and the present case were apartments. As
Professor Paul Weiler has stated, “abuses of police power will rarely affect
respectable members of the middle classes”, but will instead “focus on the poor
and on marginal, minority groups”’.
285 T. Quigley, ‘Brief Investigatory Detentions’ (2004) 42 Alberta LR 935 at 947.
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English law in the context of human rights are unlikely to be sufficient
to vindicate the remedial requirements of the Convention at
Strasbourg.286
VII. Conclusion
In the end the House of Lords found that ss. 44 and 45 were compat-
ible with the Convention. But assuming, for the sake of argument, that
the courts had identified a possible incompatibility between the Con-
vention and ss. 44 and 45 of the TA what might have been an appro-
priate remedial response? Here, for example, a court could scrutinize
the power as exercised. Sections 44 and 45 of the TA authorize the
lawful stop and search of an individual for the purposes of detecting
terrorist related crime. Under ss. 44 and 45 a stop and search for other
purposes is unlawful. Although in Gillan itself there was no question
of either an unlawful search or bad faith on the part of the police, it is
undoubtedly true that the power has been instrumental in far more
arrests for non-terrorist related offences than for those contemplated
by the TA. The power has also been used in questionable circum-
stances, as the Wolfgang episode rather publicly demonstrated. But
given the structure of ss. 44 and 45 a court simply has no way of
knowing what the motivations of an individual officer were. As we
have seen there is no objective standard which purports to control the
exercise of the power in ss. 44 and 45. Be that as it may, if a stop and
search under ss. 44 and 45 produces evidence of criminality other
than that related to terrorism, it is still admissible notwithstanding the
fact that power may have been employed unlawfully.287 In this situ-
ation a court would no doubt follow R v Khan288 where evidence
procured through infringements of both English law and Convention
rights was nevertheless admissible at trial. In England and Wales,
unless there is an adverse impact on the fairness of proceedings a trial
court will not normally289 exclude unlawfully obtained evidence.290 The
rule is a strict one. In fact it might be argued that in practice the
286 Smith and Grady v United Kingdom [1999] ECHR 33985/96 at paras. 137–9.
287 A similar situation arose in Jeffrey v Black [1978] QB 490. The police arrested a
man on suspicion of stealing a sandwich from a pub. Without a warrant or
consent the police then searched the accused’s bedsit where they discovered
cannabis. The magistrate dismissed the charges under the Misuse of Drugs Act
1971 on the basis that the evidence had been gathered unlawfully. On appeal the
Divisional Court reversed that decision, and sent the case back to be reheard.
Since October 2000 ‘unlawful’ includes, of course, acting in a manner
incompatible with Convention rights (HRA, s. 6).
288 [1997] AC 558.
289 This is the normal rule. However, in R v Olden [2007] EWCA Crim 726 the Court
of Appeal effectively excluded all the evidence that had been obtained as a
consequence of an unlawful arrest. The appellant’s conviction was quashed as a
consequence. No authority was cited by Dyson LJ for his decision.
290 This general rule is subject to exceptions. For example evidence procured through
the use of torture is inadmissible (A v Home Secretary (No. 2) [2005] UKHL 71;
[2005] 3 WLR 1249).
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strictness of the exclusionary rule fails to provide adequate protection
of Convention rights. Not only is the infrequently exercised judicial
discretion to exclude evidence on the basis of unfairness a narrow
one,291 it has been rightly described as somewhat weak.292 In these
circumstances it is not unreasonable to argue that in the context of
ss. 44 and 45 the exclusionary discretion is unlikely to provide an
effective remedy for the infringement of Convention rights. Moreover,
given that Convention rights are implicated, a new prophylactic rule
is necessary to ensure that such rights are not infringed if possible.293
After all, rights enshrined in a constitutional document deserve pro-
tection consistent with that status.294 In this context, at least, one
possible alternative to the exclusionary rule would be an inclusionary
rule, similar to the one that Scots law takes with respect to unlawfully
obtained evidence. Where unlawfully obtained evidence is led in
Scotland there is a presumption in favour of exclusion unless the
Crown can convince the court that the irregularity should be ex-
cused.295 The rule in Lawrie v Muir allows a court to balance ‘the
interests of the citizen to be protected from illegal or irregular inva-
sions of his liberties by the authorities [with the] interests of the state
to secure evidence ƒ necessary to enable justice to be done’.296 In fact
a new inclusionary rule would have a number of benefits. First and
foremost, such a rule would uphold Convention rights by providing
an effective remedy. Second, the rule would provide an incentive
against the routine use of the special power, limiting its use to cases
where terrorism might be involved. Such a prophylactic rule may help
to prevent the ss. 44 and 45 power being unlawfully used on the
pretext of a stop and search for terrorist offences. This would un-
doubtedly help to give effect to the intention of Parliament in ex-
pressly limiting the use of the power to terrorism cases. Third, given
the difficulty of detecting unlawful exercises of the power, requiring
the exercise to be justified before the Crown may lead the evidence
291 A. Choo and S. Nash, ‘Improperly Obtained Evidence in the Commonwealth:
Lessons for England and Wales’ (2007) 11 EvPro 75 at 78.
292 R. Cross and C. Tapper, Evidence, 11th edn (OUP: Oxford, 2007) 548.
293 In this context by ‘prophylactic’ I mean preventative safeguards that ensure that
constitutional violations do not occur. J. Grano, ‘Prophylactic Rules in Criminal
Procedure’ (1985) 80 NWUL Rev 100 at 105–6. M. Plaxton, ‘In Search of
Prophylactic Rules’ (2005) 50 McGill LJ 127 at 130–2.
294 Mohammed v The State [1999] 2 AC 111 at 123–4 per Lord Steyn.
295 J. Dawson, ‘The Exclusion of Unlawfully Obtained Evidence: A Comparative
Study’ (1982) 31 ICLQ 513 at 537–8. P. Duff, ‘Admissibility of Improperly Obtained
Physical Evidence in the Scottish Criminal Trial: the Search for Principle’ (2004) 8
Edin LR 152.
296 Lawrie v Muir [1950] SLT 39 at 39–40 per Lord Justice-General Cooper. A similar
balancing test, drawing on Lord Cooper’s judgment, has found favour elsewhere.
See further Mohammed, above n. 291, and R v Shaheed [2002] 3 LRC 634. Lord
Steyn in Mohammed cites (at 123) Lord Hodson in King v The Queen [1969] 1 AC
304 at 315 as authority for the balancing test his Lordship favours. However, the
dicta in King are not those of Lord Hodson but rather Lord Cooper in Lawrie
whom Lord Hodson was quoting.
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ensures that the evidence has in fact been gathered lawfully. This may
go some way in helping to maintain public confidence in the criminal
justice process. Conduct that undermines the rule of law is the sort of
conduct that a court should not tolerate much less endorse.297 And
finally, an inclusionary discretion would allow a court adequately to
weigh the public interest in prosecuting those suspected of grave
crimes. To a large extent a balancing test answers Cardozo’s
conundrum.298
Alternatively, it may be possible for the courts to read ss. 44 and 45
down by implying into the provision a requirement that an officer
should have a reasonable suspicion before he exercises the power.299
In the South African case Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of
Home Affairs300 the constitutionality of an immigration officer’s stat-
utory discretion to detain a person he believed to be an illegal im-
migrant was challenged. The power in s. 34(8) of the South African
Immigration Act 2002 to detain ‘illegal foreigners’ was not con-
strained by any criteria. There was for example no requirement that
the officer possess a reasonable suspicion that an individual was an
illegal foreigner. Thus under s. 34(8) a person who was not an illegal
foreigner, but who had been declared as such by an immigration
officer, could be lawfully detained and deported. The High Court
declared s. 34(8) to be unconstitutional. However, on appeal the Con-
stitutional Court reversed this decision. Yacoob J concluded that if the
interpretation taken by the High Court was correct, then s. 34(8) was
indeed unconstitutional. However, the section could be interpreted in
a constitutional manner by requiring that a reasonable suspicion be
present for the discretion’s lawful exercise. The adoption of such an
interpretation would not unduly strain the language of the statute.
However, a court might take the view that the legislation is so per-
missive that it is not possible to read the sections down. The protec-
tion of basic rights ‘should not be dependent upon a reliance on the
continuous exemplary conduct of the executive, something that is
impossible to monitor or control’.301 As Sopinka J observed in Little
Sisters ‘if the legislation itself lends itself to the repeated violation of
Charter rights . . . the legislative scheme itself is partially responsible
297 R v Grant [2005] 3 WLR 437 at para. 56, per Laws LJ.
298 The People v Defoe (1926) 242 NY 13 at 23–4 per Cardozo J: ‘The pettiest peace
officer would have it in his power through overzeal or indiscretion to confer
immunity upon an offender for crimes the most flagitious. A room is searched
against the law, and the body of a murdered man is found. If the place of
discovery may not be proved, the other circumstances may be insufficient to
connect the defendant with the crime. The privacy of the home has been
infringed, and the murderer goes free. Another search, once more against the
law, discloses counterfeit money or the implements of forgery. The absence of a
warrant means the freedom of the forger. Like instances can be multiplied’.
299 R v A (No. 2) [2002] 1 AC 45.
300 CCT 18/03, 2004 (4) 5A 125(CC).
301 R v Bain [1992] 1 SCR 91, at 103–104 per Cory J.
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and must be remedied’.302 A declaration of incompatibility under s. 4
of the HRA is thus the only appropriate remedy.
‘A mistake by the judiciary in times of terrorism’, concluded Justice
Barak, ‘is worse than a mistake of the legislature and the executive in
times of terrorism . . . the reason is that the judiciary’s mistakes will
remain with the democracy when the threat of terrorism passes and
will be entrenched in the case law of the court as a magnet for the
development of new and problematic laws’.303 The decision of the
House of Lords in Gillan is one such mistake. The deferential judg-
ment failed to give full and proper effect to a number of important
Convention rights, in effect leaving the executive free to introduce
broad sweeping powers of stop and search more widely. Experience
shows that the ‘relaxation of basic constraints on official power are
rarely confined to situations of the emergency that gave rise to
them’.304 At the same time the judgment in Gillan weakens the normat-
ive value of legality by approving a power that may be exercised
arbitrarily in a manner that denies equality of treatment.305
302 Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Minister of Justice) [2000] 2 SCR
1120 at para. 205, citing remarks by Dickson J, in Hunter v Southam [1984] 2 SCR
145 at 166.
303 A. Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (PUP: Princeton, 2005) 285.
304 F. A. Allen, The Habits of Legality (OUP: New York, 1996) 42.
305 Ibid. at 72.
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